yale law journal, may 3, 2001 5/3/01
link:
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/110-8/schneider.pdf
google hit “high court judge charles gray’s opinion + holoquast denial trial” link to hit: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&rlz=1T4SUNA_enUS259US259&ei=Sf_9SoKtMJPgsQOVhPGHCw&sa=X&oi=spell&resnum=0&ct=result&cd=1&ved=0CAYQBSgA&q=high+court+judge+charles+gray%27s+opinion+%2B+text+%2B+holocaust+denial+trial&spell=1
citation to legal opinion of gray:
irving v. penguin books, ltd., no. 1996-I-1113, 2000 wl 362478 (q.b. apr. 11), appeal denied (dec. 18, 2000).
law review article footnote 39, discusses duabert v. merrell dow pharmaceuticals, inc., 509 u.s. 579 (1993) as supplanting frye v. united state, 293 f. 1013, 1014 (d.c. cir. 1923) for standards dealing with admission of expert witnesses.
text from yale law review
This “ objective historian” standard may in fact be more useful in
America than in its country of origin. The “ turn to history” in American
jurisprudence29 has created an increase in the number of prominent cases
employing historical arguments.30 This Case Note focuses on the testimony
22. See, for example, Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶¶ 13.13, 5.34-5.47, in which Gray faulted
Irving for uncritical reliance on crime statistics taken from the work of Kurt Daleuge, an
enthusiastic member of the Nazi party.
23. See, for example, id. ¶¶ 13.17, 5.40-5.72, in which Gray reprimanded Irving for being
“ unduly uncritical” of witness statements by Hitler’s adjutants supporting Irving’s account,
statements which were contradicted by contemporaneous documentary evidence, including
Goebbels’s diary and police telegrams.
24. See, for example, id. ¶¶ 13.24-13.25, 5.111-5.122, in which Gray criticized Irving’s
selective treatment of the evidence regarding the shooting of Jews in Riga. Irving relied on an
order prohibiting future mass shootings to argue that the Germans had called a halt to the
shootings, while ignoring evidence from the same source that the order was limited to shootings
“ on that scale” and called for increased discretion in shootings, implying that the shootings were
to continue.
25. See, for example, id. ¶¶ 13.22, 5.90-5.110, in which Gray found that Irving misled readers
by presenting Himmler’s notes as incontrovertible evidence supporting Irving’s proposition that
Hitler had prohibited the general liquidation of Jews, and that this amounted to speculation, rather
than recitation of established facts.
26. Id. ¶ 13.31 (“ Irving has seriously misrepresented Hitler’s views on the Jewish question.
He has done so in some instances by misinterpreting and mistranslating documents and in other
instances by omitting documents or parts of them.” ).
27. See, for example, id. ¶¶ 13.117-13.125, 11.6-11.48, in which Gray condemned Irving for
relying on one document to support his claims for an inflated casualty figure for the Allied
bombing of Dresden, and for ignoring “ powerful reasons for doubting [its] genuineness,”
including accusations of forgery and internal evidence of alterations.
28. See, for example, id. ¶¶ 13.42-13.45, 5.199-5.214, in which Gray faulted Irving for failing
to consider Hitler’s motives when using accounts of his meetings with Antonescu and Horthy
during which Hitler was apparently motivated by a desire to control the fates of Hungarian and
Romanian Jews.
29. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 132 (1996).
30. One manifestation of this shift has been the historians’ briefs, or historical segments of
briefs, directed at the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Self-Advocates Becoming
Empowered at 3-10, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (No. 99-
1240); Brief of 281 American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Webster v.
Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605). For the debate regarding the historians’
brief in Webster, see Estelle B. Freedman, Historical Interpretation and Legal Advocacy, PUB.
HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 27; Michael Grossberg, The Webster Brief: History as Advocacy, or
Would You Sign It? PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 45; Jane E. Larson & Clyde Spillenger,
SCHNEIDERFINAL.DOC MAY 3, 2001 5/3/01 6:54 PM
1536 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 110: 1531
of historians serving as expert witnesses at the trial level. Historians have
testified in a range of cases: Indian rights;31 land claims;32 gender
discrimination;33 deportation of alleged Holocaust participants;34 voting
rights;35 and gay rights,36 among others. Yet, historians called upon to
testify claim that the standards applied by courts in assessing their
testimony are contradictory or irrational.37
Historians are not alone among social scientists and other non-scientific
experts in confronting an absence of coherent standards.38 The judicial
guidelines for evaluation of expert testimony have undergone substantial
redefinition over the past decade. Beginning with Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.39 in 1993, the Court abandoned the longstanding
Frye test, which looked to “ general acceptance in the particular field.” 40
Instead, the Court proposed a list of factors for the trial court to consider
including: whether a technique or theory can be (or has been) tested;41
whether it has been subject to peer review and publication;42 its known or
SCHNEIDERFINAL.DOC MAY 3, 2001 5/3/01 6:54 PM
2001] Case Note 1537
potential rate of error when applied;43 existence and maintenance of
standards and controls;44 and general acceptance.45 These factors, however,
were not presented as a “ definitive checklist” but rather as “ observations”
for the trial court to consider.46 The inquiry, the Court noted, should be a
“ flexible one.” 47 Moreover, it should focus on methodology rather than
conclusions.48
The Court’s decision in Daubert, as commentators quickly pointed out,
left unresolved the question of whether the new test for expert testimony
encompassed specialized knowledge or social science evidence as well
as scientific evidence.49 In Kumho, the Court expanded trial courts’
“ gatekeeping” function to all expert testimony,50 but again emphasized the
flexibility of the inquiry, concluding “we can neither rule out, nor rule in,
for all cases and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in
Daubert.” 51 Most recently, the December 2000 amendment of Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 codified the focus on methodology present in both Daubert and Kumho.52
30. One manifestation of this shift has been the historians’ briefs, or historical segments of
briefs, directed at the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Self-Advocates Becoming
Empowered at 3-10, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (No. 99-
1240); Brief of 281 American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Webster v.
Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605). For the debate regarding the historians’
brief in Webster, see Estelle B. Freedman, Historical Interpretation and Legal Advocacy, PUB.
HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 27; Michael Grossberg, The Webster Brief: History as Advocacy, or
Would You Sign It? PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 45; Jane E. Larson & Clyde Spillenger,
“That’s Not History,” PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 33; and James C. Mohr, Historically
Based Legal Briefs, PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 19.
31. See, e.g., Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Baca, 844 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Dupris, 612 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1979); Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F.
Supp. 784 (D. Minn. 1994), aff’d 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Michigan, 471 F.
Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979); Helen Hornbeck Tanner, History vs. the Law: Processing Indians
in the American Legal System, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 693 (1999).
32. See, e.g., Denson v. Stack, 997 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1993).
33. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). The Sears case
also gave rise to heated controversy. See, e.g., Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic
Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1629 (1988);
Alice Kessler-Harris, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: A Response to Haskell and
Levinson, 67 TEX. L. REV. 429 (1988).
34. See, e.g., Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Dailide, 953 F.
Supp. 192 (N.D. Ohio 1997); United States v. Lileikis, 929 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1996); United
States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982); United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
35. See, e.g., NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002 (2d Cir. 1995); Irby v. Fitz-
Hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1988); Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347 (M.D.
Ala. 1986); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982); Peyton McCrary, Yes,
but What Have They Done to Black People Lately? The Role of Historical Evidence in the
Virginia School Board Case, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1275 (1995); Peyton McCrary & J. Gerald
Hebert, Keeping the Courts Honest: The Role of Historians as Expert Witnesses in Southern
Voting Rights Cases, 16 S.U. L. REV. 101 (1989).
36. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d
487, 489 (Ky. 1993).
37. See, e.g., Peter Charles Hoffer, “Blind to History”: The Use of History in Affirmative
Action Suits, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 271, 272 (1992); N.E.H. Hull & Peter Charles Hoffer, Historians
and the Impeachment Imbroglio: In Search of a Serviceable History, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 473, 486
(2000); Tanner, supra note 31.
38. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropologist as Expert Witness, 79 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 555 (1977), reprinted in LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY 499 (Peter Sack ed.,
1992).
39. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
40. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
41. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 594.
44. Id. Although this factor is not listed separately in many accounts of Daubert, I follow the
most recent Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 702 in describing it as a fifth factor. FED. R.
EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
45. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
46. Id. at 593.
47. Id. at 594.
48. Id. at 595; Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating
that the inquiry as to the admissibility of expert testimony must focus solely on principles and
methodology, not on conclusions that they generate (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595)); see also
Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 869
(1994) (“ It’s The Methodology, Stupid!” ). But see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146
(1997) (upholding the trial court’s inquiry into an expert’s conclusions).
49. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly
Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2271 (1994); see also Teresa S. Renaker, Evidentiary Legerdemain: Deciding
When Daubert Should Apply to Social Science Evidence, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1657 (1996)
(questioning the applicability of Daubert to psychological evidence).
50. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999); Marc N. Garber, Opening
Daubert’s Gate: Testing the Reliability of an Expert’s Experiences After Kumho, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 2000, at 4; Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining
“Reliable” Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317 (2000).
51. 526 U.S. at 150. The Court went on to say that it also consciously refrained from making
a definitive judgment of the applicability of Daubert factors “ for subsets of cases categorized by
category of expert or kind of evidence. Too much depends on the particular circumstances of the
particular case.” Id.
52. The recent amendment of Rule 702 provides, in part, for the admission of expert
testimony if “ (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702. The Advisory Committee’s note
indicates that the revision was prompted by Daubert and Kumho. Id. advisory committee’s note.
daubert v. merrel dow pharmaceuticals, 509 u.s. 570, http://laws.findlaw.com/us/509/579.html, & http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=509&invol=579
the summary of the headnotes is a very good precise of the opinion, which holds:
1.)federal rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony in trials;
2.)foundational elements deal with the reliability of the testimony and its relevance, (and, most assuredly, its materiality);
3.)faced with a proffer of expert testimony, the trial judge must make an initial assessment under federal rule 104(a) whether the testimony’s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and can be applied to the facts at issue. standards enumerated. “the inquiry is a flexible one, and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.
4.)cross examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising “general acceptance” standard, is the appropriate means by which evidence based on valid principles may be challenged. That even limited screening by the trial judge, on occasion, will prevent the jury from hearing of authentic scientific breakthroughs is simply a consequence of the fact that the rules are not designed to seek cosmic understanding but, rather, to resolve legal disputes. Pp. 15-17.
Held:
The Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provide the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. Pp. 4-17.
(a) Frye's "general acceptance" test was superseded by the Rules' adoption. The Rules occupy the field, United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 , and, although the common law of evidence may serve as an aid to their application, id., at 51-52, respondent's assertion that they somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Nothing in the Rules as a [509 U.S. 579, 2] whole or in the text and drafting history of Rule 702, which specifically governs expert testimony, gives any indication that "general acceptance" is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules' liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony. Pp. 4-8.
(b) The Rules - especially Rule 702 - place appropriate limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence by assigning to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. The reliability standard is established by Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to "scientific . . . knowledge," since the adjective "scientific" implies a grounding in science's methods and procedures, while the word "knowledge" connotes a body of known facts or of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as true on good grounds. The Rule's requirement that the testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" goes primarily to relevance by demanding a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility. Pp. 9-12.
(c) Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the trial judge, pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony's underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and properly can be applied to the facts at issue. Many considerations will bear on the inquiry, including whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community. The inquiry is a flexible one, and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. Throughout, the judge should also be mindful of other applicable Rules. Pp. 12-15.
(d) Cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising "general acceptance" standard, is the appropriate means by which evidence based on valid principles may be challenged. That even limited screening by the trial judge, on occasion, will prevent the jury from hearing of authentic scientific breakthroughs is simply a consequence of the fact that the Rules are not designed to seek cosmic understanding but, rather, to resolve legal disputes. Pp. 15-17.
951 F.2d 1128 (CA9 1991), vacated and remanded. [509 U.S. 579, 3]
from the text of the opinion:
“The merits of the Frye test have been much debated, and scholarship on its proper scope and application is legion. 4 [509 U.S. 579, 6] Petitioners' primary attack, however, is not on the content, but on the continuing authority, of the rule. They contend that the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 5 We agree.” pp. 6-7
[john jay: the holding is laughably simple. no argument over frye, apparently whose quick passage is not to be lamented by the court, over its reasoning. the court just flat out agrees with the petitioner’s (plaintiff in the action alleging pre-natal damage) assertion that the frye test is superseded by the federal rule of evidence 702. it couldn’t be any simpler than that.
thus, the federal rule governs the admission of expert testimony.
the rest of the opinion is to establish, presumably, the judicial gloss on just what that means. pretty straightforward approach.: john jay.]
from the text of the opinion:
We interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988). Rule 402 provides the baseline:
‘All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules [509 U.S. 579, 7] prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.’
‘Relevant evidence" is defined as that which has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’
Rule 401. The Rule's basic standard of relevance thus is a liberal one.” p. 7
[john jay: in short, if the evidence proffered meets relevance criteria towards judging the issue as hand, then the presumption if you will, is toward the admission of the proffered testimony.: john jay.]
from the text of the opinion:
“Here there is a specific Rule that speaks to the contested issue. Rule 702, governing expert testimony, provides:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, [509 U.S. 579, 8] or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
“Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes "general acceptance" as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a "general acceptance" standard. The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid "general acceptance" requirement would be at odds with the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules and their "general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to `opinion' testimony." Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S., at 169 (citing Rules 701 to 705). See also Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991) ("The Rules were designed to depend primarily upon lawyer-adversaries and sensible triers of fact to evaluate conflicts").” pp. 8-9
[john jay: the authority of the judge to exclude extraneous/collateral controversy is not constrained by this ruling that f.r. 702 governs the admissibility of scientific evidence, and not the frye standard. Notes the court in the following passage, the trial court has to make an assessment of credibility. : john jay.]
from the text of the opinion:
“That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place [509 U.S. 579, 9] no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. 7 Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules, the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.
“The primary locus of this obligation is Rule 702, which clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," an expert "may testify thereto." (Emphasis added.) The subject of an expert's testimony must be "scientific . . . knowledge." 8 The adjective "scientific" implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word "knowledge" [connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.] The term "applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986). Of course, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be "known" to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science. See, e.g., Brief for Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. as Amici Curiae 9 ("Indeed, scientists do not assert that they know what is immutably `true' - they are committed to searching for new, temporary theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena"); Brief for American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8 ("Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about [509 U.S. 579, 10] the universe. Instead, it represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement" (emphasis in original). But, in order to qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or assertion must be [derived by the scientific method.] Proposed testimony must be supported by [appropriate validation] - i.e., "good grounds," based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge" establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 9 “
[john jay: in short, there must be disciplined methodology.: john jay.]
[and, a further limitation upon a proffer of scientific evidence is found in other rules, 703, 706, & 403.]
from the text of the case:
“Throughout, a judge assessing a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other applicable rules. Rule 703 provides that expert opinions based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if the facts or data are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." Rule 706 allows the court at its discretion to procure the assistance of an expert of its own choosing. Finally, Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially [509 U.S. 579, 15] outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . . ." Judge Weinstein has explained: "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge, in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules, exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses." Weinstein, 138 F.R.D., at 632.”
[john jay: and, finally, a very interesting observation from the court on the judge’s function as evidentiary gate keeper in this whole process. the court recognizes that the role of science is to find/search/posit/argue large truths. the court says, however, that the time involved in this process is not necessarily appropriate for the great job of the courts, that being quick and definitive conflict resolution. in the bluntest of terms, the court says that the interests of quick resolution and finality of result, e.g., preventing litigation that might see saw on the edge of scientific investigation from one epoch to another, outway the interest of finding ultimate philosophical/scientific/ethical truths. in short, better sure than absolute. you might not like the position, but it is fairly and unequivocally stated as an institutional bias of the courts by the majority in this case.: john jay.]
from the text of the court:
“Petitioners and, to a greater extent, their amici exhibit a different concern. They suggest that recognition of a screening role for the judge that allows for the exclusion of "invalid" evidence will sanction a stifling and repressive scientific orthodoxy, and will be inimical to the search for truth. See, e.g., Brief for Ronald Bayer et al. as Amici Curiae. It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and scientific analyses. Yet there are important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, however, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment - often of great consequence - about a particular set of events in the past. We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding, [509 U.S. 579, 17] but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes. 13” p. 17.
[the court’s holding: john jay]
from the text of the court:
“To summarize: "General acceptance" is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence - especially Rule 702 - do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.” p. 17.
black’s law dictionary, revised fourth edition, 1968, west publishing, st. paul, Minnesota
collateral. by the side; at the side; attached upon the side. not lineal, but upon a parallel or diverging line. …. . p. 327
collateral facts. such as are outside the controversy, or are not directly connected with the principal matter or issue in dispute. summerour v. felker, 102 g. 254, 29 s.e. 448; garner v. state, 76 miss. 515, 25 so. 363; jones v. state, 70 ga.app. 431, 28 s.e.2d 373, 386.