chapter 1. general “little phil” sheridan: “the only good indian is a dead indian.”
“little phil” sheridan knew the aim of war, and its full cost, serving as grant’s cavalry commander and then conducting the campaigns after the war which destroyed the indians of the great plains as a military and political force, and as societies. he was, as a matter of fact, simply doing to the indians no less than he had done to the confederate states of america and the societies which formed it, no less thoroughly and, no more. roundly excoriated for having said that the only good indian is a dead indian, rather than expressing a racist’s sentiment he may simply have been clearly expressing the soldier’s belief that the task of defeating an enemy in war devolves around the task of defeating that enemy so thoroughly that he does not fight you again, … , and again, … , and again. for sheridan, the task of war was to decisively put an end to conflict, not to promote it forever, by killing your enemy and destroying the means supporting his fight. sheridan did to the plains indians as he had done to the confederate bread basket of the shenandoah valley, destroying buffalo and granary alike.
no person is as contemptuous of the futility or empty gesture of fighting for no purpose as the professional soldier, or of fighting that engenders future conflict: and war is most certainly a futile exercise if not conducted in such a manner as reasonably calculated to foreclose additional fighting over the same issues or circumstances. the whole point of fighting and killing your enemy is to do it in such a manner that his ability to fight and his willingness to fight again is taken out of him. why fight at all, if you fight only in such a manner as to guarantee future inconclusive warfare?
to sheridan, to fight an enemy in such a manner and only upon his terms, so that he might rise and fight again when it seemed opportune, would have seemed, … , not wise to say the least of the matter, and ridiculous in the extreme..
which brings us to today’s topic, and that is, how will israel do in the upcoming war, and in the wars likely to follow close upon it. i speak, of course, of the conflict brought on by syria and hezbollah, once they have secured their political hold upon lebanon. it will be the war orchestrated by iran to divert israel’s attention from the nuclear project in isfahan, and to preoccupy israel so that she does not launch a pre-emptive strike to take the facility out..
the short answer is supplied, i think, in phil sheridan’s likely remarks after having watched an arab & israeli war, “how in the hell can you kill anyone in 10 days of fighting?”
the longer answer to the question posed, is that israel will do splendidly in the next war blowing up targets of one sort of another, and to the extent that the arabs display an almost uncanny ability to be in targets when struck by aerial attack or artillery bombardment, she will inflict a certain amount of incidental casualties. but, israel will not do what is necessary in war, and that is, she will not kill her enemies in droves, as “little phil” sheridan would rapidly recognize. she will allow them to live to fight israel another day, and another day after that. surely, somewhere, phil sheridan will be profoundly confused. he simply will not understand a nation that wars against an enemy who has sworn its annihilation, by calling that enemy on the phone to warn of a bombardment, in order to limit casualties: he would be seen and heard in a corner, muttering to himself, “don’t they understand, ‘the only good arab is a dead arab.’”
so, in some respect we will see a reprise of israeli success in previous wars.
and, in some respects, we shall see the birth of future conflict, because israel cannot bring herself to kill her enemies in righteous self defense, and it should be added, in sufficient numbers to forestall their future attacks. israel cannot get the notion straight that war is about killing in order to keep from being killed. déjà vu all over again.
we will see footage of israel smart air weapons destroying trucks, tanks, planes on the ground, and buildings, and after a few days even the arabs will wise up and leave them mostly vacant, or sleep detached from them.
but, israel will not kill her enemies. indeed, she will take extraordinary measures against doing so, and she shall be & will feel genuinely rebuked if she kills civilians by accident, although you may rest assured that phil sheridan would have a hard time understanding just what a “civilian” is in a populace that supports, aids and abets, and allows its children to be used as shields while upon the battlefield watching the adult.
the male arab populace called “boys” the rest of the world over, will be at the scene of the battle watching their fathers and uncles and brothers fight, and they will learn how to fight and take part in it. they are in essence in battle field training wherever they are near, and wherever there is a battlefield, but israel will not target them, so they wander brazenly throughout the battles, being “shields,” fetching weapons from the fallen, running errands and being communications couriers, knowing all the while that blind luck alone will kill some of their numbers, but purposeful israel conduct will not.
and, yes, phil sheridan will wonder at this.
so, israel will wage her defensive war aggressively, but in a very limited manner, and she will use the ordnance at her disposal to destroy hard and soft targets, and she will advance upon arab positions and knock them out.
and, then, she will come to a stop, and look to negotiate the continued existence of her enemy, because having destroyed all the materials and strategic objectives necessary to defend herself and remove the threat of arab aggressions against her cities and her towns, she will have nothing left to do but to kill her enemy, and that she will refuse to do.[1]
israel will have destroyed the caches of small arms that she and the united states and the euro’s have supplied the arabs, and she will have destroyed the armored personnel carriers and anti aircraft weapons given to the arabs, and she will have destroyed the unite effectiveness of the “troops” trained by herself and the united states, in a former life known as hamas and abbas, … , again to the utter amazement of the ghost of little phil sheridan, … , and, then things will grind to a halt.
because she will reach a point where there is only to kill people. the enemy.
and, she doesn’t have the will to do it.
nor, the means.
the one follows the other, in a military sense, as we shall explore.
“little phil” sheridan lived in an age where the weapons of war were rudimentary: muskets that could not reliably hit targets much past 40 or 50 yards, rifles that were ineffective much past 150 yards, and cannons that were nothing more than random events at much over ½ mile in range. air power was hot air observation balloons, and communication on the battlefield was by battle flags, semaphores and trumpets, and mounted couriers who carried hand scribbled commands.
but phil sheridan understood warfare, and he and a very well trained cadre of west point graduates knew how to carry it on, as did his contemporaries and his enemies, and in the civil war they managed to kill over 700,000 combatants, and inflict an unknown number of civilian casualties. they did it just like it was done on the medieval battlefields, e.g., that is they got close to each other and fought savagely, so they could achieve the purpose at hand.
they did it with infantry engagement, and by bringing their soldiers into such proximity with the enemy that even with the technology available to them, which wasn’t much, they knew with assurance that they could kill their enemy.
these officers, proficient in the science and art of napoleonic maneuver, and well on their way to inventing the engineered entrenchment defenses of world war one, knew with fatalistic assurance that likewise, the enemy would kill their soldiers, and also would kill them, in great numbers. indeed, i know of no other conflict in u.s. history in which so many general officers died in battle, or in which so many participated in battle, often leading bitterly contested assaults against dug in and entrenched positions.
and, at precisely this point israel will cease doing a splendid job in the coming battles, because at this point israel refuses to join further battle. it is because israel has eschewed the key element of battle by which the attack upon an enemy is carried home, and that missing element of battle is the infantry engagement where the true killing takes place, whether by small arms fire or by artillery. israel has left the infantry engagement out of her battle doctrine, and simply neglected adequately training and preparing her troops for that part of battle, … , where the killing takes place.
nowhere is this neglect and lack of training shown more starkly or dramatically, paradoxically enough, than in the performance of israel’s elite commando forces, who are among the best in the world at what they do: unfortunately, what they do is not dedicated to killing, or, more precisely, what they do is not dedicated to killing in numbers. they arrive on scene, by stealth or subterfuge, they kill a few enemy very precisely and surgically, and they then extract the hostages or liberate a captured bus, and they leave.
they are not dedicated to prolonged engagement, which, as a matter of fact, runs true of all the elite forces in the world. there is a reason for this. it is because the training and expense involved in producing such men, makes their use in battle profligate, and no one will waste such troops.
and, this precisely reveals the secret about infantry. to have infantry die in battle is not expensive, it is not profligate, and it is not wasteful in the military and strategic analysis, in the professional military person’s way of looking at such things. that infantry die in battle in most militaries in an accepted truth of the matter, even by the infantry and those who command and those who comprise it. in order for you to kill your enemy in large numbers in protracted battle, you have to expose your own men, your fellow citizens, your sons and daughters, your nephews and nieces, … , yourself, … , to the risks of ordinary battle such as are deemed acceptable. it is understood that when you expose your infantry to close order battle, that even if they are as good as your training can make ordinary infantry, some of them will be killed. and, it is understood by each who fights in the infantry, that he or she may be killed.
and, this is accepted.
now, it is also true, that when you expose elite troops to close order battle, usually inadvertently when they are surprised (hey, it happens even to the best), some of them will be killed as well. this is not accepted, either in the israeli military, or in the united states military. navy seals, for example, are too valuable to be exposed to death at the hands of some illiterate and untrained rag head, who launches a bullet at random which by an unhappy fortuity strikes a superbly trained warrior..
take, by way of illustration, the marine assault upon fallujah, or the marines and allies rooting al sadr’s forces out of the various cemeteries adjacent to central mosques in iraq. these battles were pressed against the islamic jihadists with the finest infantry on the face of the earth, the most highly trained, the most motivated, the deadliest infantry on earth: even they, given superior fire power and training, given levels of marksmanship and fire discipline and accuracy only dreamt of by their foes, … , even they, the finest infantry in the world, took casualties, and sustained deaths in their fellows.
and, i might add, in this i would be supported by phil sheridan, … , they suffered casualties on a predictable basis, and at predictable rates: the military arts are also a science, after all, given to intense scrutiny and study for millennia. that they did not suffer more is testament to their fighting skill and resolve, their doctrine of swift movement and always pressing the attack, and their marksmanship skills, … , but even so, marines died.
our military command understands this, many having come up through the infantry and many having experienced infantry battle. our society accepts this, if only begrudgingly, … , but, the portion of our society who contributes the soldiers and marines who die in combat for love of country, and for duty and honor, … , understands this. it is an accepted reality.
it is not an accepted reality in israel.
her citizens do not accept that her sons and daughters and nieces and nephews die in infantry combat. the numbers are too high, the price too dear, to sustain.
as a result, israeli battle doctrine is neither geared toward nor accepting of combat infantry death. as a result of this, israeli infantry is not adequately trained in the doctrine or the experience of prolonged close order combat. not having trained intensely for it, not having a history of being particularly good at it, … , israeli soldiers are not very discipline or motivated or adept at infantry warfare. as a result, when israel is confronted with infantry battle, she declines it and does not wage it. i can guarantee you, that u.s. marines would have made short work of entrenched hezbollah in southern lebanon. and, i can guarantee you, they would have incurred casualties. but, such defenses would not have held up a marine combined assault, and not for days, as they did the israeli offensive.
phil sheridan would have a very hard time comprehending this statement, and even a harder time accepting it when he saw the reality of it, but, israel will stop fighting the next war when she has secured her population from attack, when she has destroyed the assets of her enemy capable of carrying on such attack, and when she begins to suffer combat infantry deaths in any sort of meaningful number. it is a price she is unwilling to pay. and, because she is unwilling to pay it, it means that she does not and will not again kill enough of her arab attackers to make it simply not worth the risk ever to attack her again. israel does not engage in this sort of infantry battle where she could kill vast numbers of her enemy, because she will not accept the level of her own combat dead in order to kill her enemy.
so, she fights the same war to the same point and the same lack of conclusion, over and over again.
in the later part of the civil war, in a battle called “cold harbor” with the confederacy defending the approaches to richmond, virginia the union army suffered as many as 6,000 killed (according to some authorities, fewer according to others) in a single day, attacking entrenched confederate soldiers who had the nearby strategic high ground.[2] this death and carnage was not suffered at the infliction of machine gun fire or high rate of fire by modern field artillery, but by fire from single shot muzzle loading black power rifles firing round lead balls, and front loading blackpowder cannon firing no doubt grape shot and nails, and the like.
the u.s. army at normandy suffered about 2,500 killed in action on the 1st day of normandy, over an invasion front of nearly 40 miles. the united states marines did not suffer such death on the first day of the iwo jima invasion. it is generally accepted that no other bloodier single day of battle involving the american military has ever been fought.
such death on a battlefield occurs only when infantry joins battle, toe to toe, and is intent on serious killing.
this is the weakness of israel. she will not engender the risk to her troops, to put them in such killing proximity to their enemy, so that they may kill enough arabs to dissuade them from ever attacking israel again. this is the weakness of israel, and the thing that phil sheridan will never comprehend, this reluctance to kill in order to assure that war does not happen again, any time soon.
this explains why the arabs have attacked israel with such frequency even given the stinging defeats they have suffered, and it is because in terms of warfare, war & repeated wars have cost the arabs nothing. they are replenished the supplies and materials they squander by the russians and the euros and the americans, and by euro and american oil dollars. and, yes, even by israeli subsidy. the arabs really suffer very little meaningful loss of material and wealth in these wars, as israel does not destroy property the arabs have to buy, and does not attack arab cities or civilians, and does not attack arab infrastructure in any meaningful sense. and when it comes to the killing time, especially then, the arabs know that the israelis will not do the killing in the numbers that the arabs understand and appreciate. the palestinians, for instance, know that the jordanians will kill them in appreciable numbers, and hamas and abbas know they are capable of slaughtering each other, but they know that the israelis will not, and so the palestinians have no hesitancy to attack israel. they are not afraid of israeli reprisal, as it does not amount to much.
israel kills a few arab troops. and, this given the arab birth rate and demographics, is something that is in almost endless supply, in fact, demographically the arabs are simply awash in militarily eligible single males, … , and, is in the starkest terms possible, a resource that is remarkably cheap for the arabs.
in short, given the way the israelis fight, the wars mounted by the arabs are just about cost free. it literally costs an arab country nothing to go to war against israel. it is sad, but it is very true.
they have all the population in the world which they are ready to sacrifice; they are willing to suffer untold deaths, if only for the opportunity to destroy israel.
so, war will be constant and recurring, because the wars cost the arabs nothing, in comparative terms. they are for free, in a geopolitical sense. so, they will happen again and again, and very soon.
this is the weakness of the israel stance on battlefield death.
this is the greatness of the israeli stance on battlefield death. it confounds me: it is highly ethical, but it is a foolish existential posture, as it places israel’s very existence in continual peril. you cannot be an ethical voice in the world, if you do not exist. it confounds phil sheridan. he simply would not understand the reluctance of the israelis to kill their enemies, even though he witnessed the same thing from his countrymen years ago, even as they told him, fight our wars against the plains indians, just do not kill too many of them.
at some point, it seems to me, israel will have to kill enough arabs to persuade them to stop attacking her, and in order to do so, she is going to have to accept infantry deaths, and contend with that by making and training her infantry equal to the task at hand. israelis have to accept that many of her finest will have to die in order to secure the continued existence of israel.
it is that simple.
either that, or fight this war repeatedly, forever.
chapter 2. yassar arafat: war is free, we fight until we win.
it is my contention that war costs the arab states nothing to wage. they will wage war that costs them nothing until they finally win, … , it costs them nothing to do so.
it is israel’s destruction to follow this endless cycle of conflict.
if this is so, one might ask, why then do the arab states not wage war more often, on a continuous basis, as it were. there are, quite succinctly, two answers to that. the first answer is that they are, and they have. the arab states, the o.i.c., the muslim brotherhood, wage continuous war on israel through their proxies and have done so, since the inception of the state of israel. black september, the p.l.o., hamas, abbas, hezbollah and factions and groups to numerous to mention. the second answer is that while war costs islam and the pan-arabic community nothing, the loss of wars is quite costly to one group that tends to mind to its own interests very closely, and those are the persons who occupy the position of state craft and people the governments of arabia: the politicians. to lose war for them is unemployment, usually via the mechanism of death. the inertia of governments that wish to stay in governance is the one inhabitation of even more overt state aggression against israel.
the truth in these assertions is found in the state of iran, which is governed by a group of muslim clerics who really have no vested interested in seeing iran governed by a secular government, and, indeed, are hostile to the very nature of government as it rivals the role of islam. and, from them, we see that the inhibiting factor, which acts to prevent the more frequent occurrence of war in order to protect regimes, does not really function.
the leaders of iran are quite willing to go to war with israel, even if it means the destruction of the country of iran and the death of many its citizens, if by doing so israel can be destroyed to the profit of islam. recently a high cleric said that even if israel were to kill 15 million iranians in a nuclear retaliation for an iranian nuclear attack which destroyed israel, the price would be worth it to islam.
the mystery is why no one in the west takes such assertions seriously. the greater mystery is why no one in israel takes such assertions seriously.
there is no utility in peace for the arab states. they cannot destroy israel through the installation of a lasting peace, although, they can destroy israel through a protracted process of negotiating peace. there is no subtle irony or hidden meaning in that sentence, we watch the whole wretched process every day on the news, each israeli concession to the peace process met by a new and more outrageous arab negotiating posture.
there is no great risk posed by war for the arab states, save the occasional regime change associated with prosecuting unsuccessful war. for the arab states war represents no great loss of life, in any demographic sense, nor does it represent destruction of infrastructure, or loss of capital or productivity in the economy. it does represent a rather salutary minor diminution of a vast demographic bubble of perfectly useless boys and unattached, uneducated and illiterate single males, who are, at best, something of a management problem for the regimes that have them.
no great penalty awaits the arab state that fights israel and looses, because just when israel obtains the situation in which she could inflict major damage, she stops waging war.
she is reluctant to deliver the killing shot.
were “little phil” sheridan present, he would growl, “the only good arab is a dead arab.” and, he would mean it. if phil sheridan waged war upon them, he would kill them until they were beaten, and knew they were beaten, and he would kill them until they were not a threat to make war against israel ever again, and perhaps an extra dollop just past that. to be sure. simple as that.
as it stands right now, israel is faced with the prospect of internecine attack by the arab state proxies, and the very predictable intermittent flare up of major conflicts waged by the arab states.
she is also faced with the prospect of iran either obtaining the nuclear weapon, in which case iran will use it against israel, see “war and logic,” this blog, the link:
http://wintersoldier2008.typepad.com/summer_patriot_winter_sol/2008/05/war-and-logic.html
or, she is face with the prospect of destroying the nuclear weapon by conventional attack from time to time, in order to prevent iran from getting it.
i make a modest proposal. if israel is unwilling to kill sufficient arabs by use of conventional arms in conventional wars because she is unwilling to bear the price of very high losses of her own infantry, as discussed above, then the only way to deter islam and the arab states from fighting continuously is to use the nuclear option against them. if israel cannot bring herself to fight conventional war in such a manner as to kill sufficient numbers of arabs to deter them from these incessant wars, then she will either be destroyed by the arabs waging conventional war, or by the iranians using their own nuclear arsenal. if israel cannot break out of this strategic stranglehold that she is in, then she has only one option left to preserve her existence, and that is to use her nuclear weapons on the arab/islamic states.
history has precedent, to justify the use of nuclear weapons under such onslaught.--
even at the end of world war ii, and the losses of iwo jima and okinawa, japan occupied a formidable military presence. though her blue water navy was in ruins, she had a capable submarine force with blue water ocean operational capacity, she had nearly 1200 combat planes in deep revetments immune from air attack, and she had 6 million troops in the field and under arms in and around the islands, and dispersed throughout china and asia.
she had the interior lines of transport and communication to get those troops to the home islands, and she had the interior lines of defense by which to wage war against the united states.
and, she had the religious, cultural, and societal wherewithal by which to wage continuing war.
two bombs, “little boy” and “fat boy” dropped on hiroshama and nagasacki took the fight from japan. it did so by shaking to its very foundations japanese religious belief in the infallibility of the emperor. it did so by the removal of the religious and social and cultural elites whose fanaticism waged and promoted the war, this removal institutionalized by the american occupation of japan so wisely engineered by douglas macarthur.
and, the use of the nuclear weapon demonstrated convincingly to the japanese that the americans had the capability of killing them and the will to kill them in sufficient numbers and with sufficient dispatch on a continuing basis, if need be, to fatally hurt japan, and to prevent her from waging war. and, it convincingly demonstrated that the u.s. could inflict these horrendous damages upon japan no risks of further meaningful casualties to the allied forces.
japan capitulated.
instantly.
japan has been deterred from aggressive warfare for 60 years, such were the lessons imparted upon her by those two bombs. the lives saved from the rigors of brutal war by the use of those two weapons are incalculable. if you doubt that assertion from me, ask the chinese, the viet namese, the thais and the american soldiers and marines who would have mounted the invasion of japan.
japan, warlike, bellicose and aggressive, embraced pacifism. (from which it now emerges, given the “genius” of barrack obama, but that is another story.)
i suggest that israel use her nuclear weapons upon islam and the arab states in a similar fashion, to deter the arabs forever from war, and to put an end to this cycle of interminable war which ultimately will enable iran to obtain nuclear weapons, which she will use on israel.
israel must pursue this course, or face oblivion. because, in the words of doctor john, the wonderful new orleans blues pianist, the arabs will simply do it wrong until they do it right, if they are not deterred.
as it stands right now, and given the posture of israel described above, there simply is no downside to the arab states’s and pan-arabic jihad’s continuing and unremitting attack on israel. they will attack her, and wage war upon her, until they win and destroy her, and send her to her oblivion.
phil sheridan did not fight war so that he could turn around and be faced with the prospect of fighting it again. he fought war, to conclude the fighting, one way or the other. and, the only way he knew was the soldier’s method, when diplomacy fails, and that was by killing one’s enemy until he had no fight left in him.
need anyone reading this essay be told, if you have gotten this far, what the current state of world diplomacy is?
if it comes to war, and it will, remember this as apropos, “the only good arab is a dead arab.”
it is, in the very starkness of its assertion, seemingly so cruel and callous and indifferent, in reality a noble and elevating sentiment. it is, afterall, the only sentiment that really secures peace through war.
john jay @ 05.13.2009
[1] in the recent foray into gaza israel began to call up infantry reserves, after she began moving tanks into some of the more urban areas of gaza, having run out of ready targets from the air. i read an interview conducted of several reservists who had just been called up, and who were justifiably quite worried about being thrust into a combat situation with very little preparation. but, they were very relieved, they told the interviewer, to find out that when they arrived at the combat zone, the israeli regulars, the “professionals,” were taking every precaution possible to keep them from harm’s way. the regulars, the “professionals,” were holding the infantry back from battle, back from direct contact with the hamas irregulars. i knew then that the battle was off: it is too expensive for anyone to kill opposing troops one at a time with tank rounds, and the israelis had already decided it was too expensive to kill infantry with infantry, even irregulars like hamas. the point is, infantry is not withheld from battle, infantry is to seek out and join battle. in every sense of the word, including the most forlorn, pathetic irony of the matter, infantry is expendable. it is the least expensive of all fighting, the most subject to “waste.”
[2] the confederate forces may have experienced as many as 1,500 battle deaths over the same period.
I would add, if the next aggression against Israel is motivated by Islam, as is most likely, that Israel should also nuke the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, perhaps hitting one 9 times, the other 11 times. Arabs would not miss the numerical significance.
Posted by: Robert | May 14, 2009 at 10:06 AM
robert:
it would be the pretty rare bird that would stick around to do the counting.
i do share the sentiment.
i have always thought that for the west to occupy the cities mentioned would take a bit of the starch out of the islamic jihad.
perhaps your idea is better.
john jay
milton freewater, oregon usa
Posted by: jj | May 14, 2009 at 11:06 AM
friends:
the link in the post looks a bit "infirm," but, i tried it & it works.
take a look at the previous article, much along the same lines, and see what you think.
john jay
Posted by: jj | May 14, 2009 at 11:10 AM
Mr. Jay,
I'm a new reader to your essays and BLOG. I read your Feb '09 treatise sent me by my friend, David Selbourne. we both agree your writing style is both refreshing, intelligently presented, and your message straight forward. "Well done" is an understatement for your prose.
This "Little Phil" piece is an interesting read that associates history lessons in the resolution of current recurring threats. The same message can applied not only to Israel but to other nations involved with defeating the Third Great Jihad.
Novel, to read that hard lessons learned from history aren't lost by all and can be used as underpenning for resolution of today's problems and challenges. Too bad more intellectuals do not engage their brains (as you seem to make a practice doing) before spouting mostly empty, noxious thoughts and opinions.
I hope to share a few of my thoughts on the dreary situations we have had heaped upon our plates in future notes. It is apparent that you carry with you a full set of cooking, carving, serving, and table ware. Keep up the fine effort. More later as our nation and world continues to turn and burn.
Kill for Peace,
Rod Rawlings
US Army (ret)
Posted by: Rod | May 19, 2009 at 03:50 PM
dear rod:
thank you for your kind and considered remarks.
i would be happy to hear from you, and mr. selbourne, on any matters you might wish to address.
my guess is that you will present your views candidly and with vigor, and i look forward to hearing from you. both.
john jay
Posted by: john jay | May 19, 2009 at 04:17 PM
John,
I don't know all your sources for reference information, but came across this in the MEF and thought you might find it of some interest. It is not directly related to the Isreali hesitance for a decisive engagement, but is one of Bush 43's last presentations to one of the Beltway Think Tanks. The problem is it reflects the failure of all democratic nations' need to call the spade a shovel and deal with the Islamic threat to the non-Muslim world as a whole rather than just killing the few expendable radical soldiers and waiting for the next wave of cannon fodder to appear - my tactical military training has been to engage the near targets and those at max-effective range at the same time and the over-the-horizon targets (strategic engagements) as intelligence and time allows. To this point, we as a nation have failed to close with and destroy the enemy on a strategic level. And for the forseeable future, our closet Muslim and his pathetic advisors may not choose to engage those targets at max-effective range, which will keep us in a continual defensive posture - not sound strategy for winning a war. It has been acknowledged, even by Sheridan, "Once the meeting engagement begins, all previous detailed OP Plans go out the window and get replaced by a series of FRAG Orders to continue the fight.
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2009, pp. 75-80
http://www.meforum.org/2137/george-w-bush-america-reshaped-approach-middle-east
On December 5, 2008, President George W. Bush delivered his valedictory Middle East policy speech (excerpted below) before the Brookings Institution's Saban Forum in Washington, D.C.,[1] a tour d'horizon of developments in the region, ranging from the fight against terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 and the decision both to invade and democratize Iraq, to rapprochement with Libya, the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and, finally, the Annapolis peace process.
Bush's omissions, however, are also illustrative. He speaks of extremism but, more than seven years after the 9/11 attacks, fails to mention Islamist ideology as a motivating factor. And while he had declared a global war on terrorism, he draws equivalence between Palestinians and Israelis killed during the Palestinian terrorist campaign of 2001 and appears also to draw equivalence between the refusal of late Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat to make peace and the reluctance by Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon to offer territorial concessions in the face of terror. He defends the logic of preemption, which led to the invasion of Iraq, but curiously does not link Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's decision to surrender his nuclear program to the demonstration of U.S. power.
While Bush defends his administration's support of dissidents, he ignores the backsliding that occurred in his second term in Egypt and Lebanon, which arguably left democrats and liberals in a worse position than before. And, when discussing the Annapolis peace process, he never reconciles this with his first-term refusal to deal with terrorist leaders.[2] Nor does he address his administration's reversal on Iran, offering incentives and diplomatic concessions despite continuing Iranian defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
The Middle East constituted the chief U.S. foreign policy challenge of the Bush years, and there is little doubt that 9/11 represented a paradigm shift in U.S. policy. But whether historians will accept Bush's claims to success, outlined at the Saban Center, remain to be seen.
—The Editors.
A Central Role in U.S. Policy
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President George W. Bush stands with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, April 25, 2002, at the Bush Ranch in Crawford, Texas. The president noted during his speech to the Saban Forum that although Saudi Arabia has been "a breeding ground for radicalism," the kingdom has now "become a determined partner in the fight against terror."
From our earliest days as a nation, the Middle East has played a central role in American foreign policy. One of America's first military engagements as an independent nation was with the Barbary pirates. One of our first consulates was in Tangiers. Some of the most fateful choices made by American Presidents have involved the Middle East—including President Truman's decision to recognize Israel 60 years ago this past May.
In the decades that followed that brave choice, American policy in the Middle East was shaped by the realities of the Cold War. Together with strong allies in the Middle East, we faced down and defeated the threat of communism to the region. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the primary threat to America and the region became violent religious extremism. Through painful experience, it became clear that the old approach of promoting stability is unsuited to this new danger—and that the pursuit of security at the expense of liberty would leave us with neither one. Across the Middle East, many who sought a voice in the future of their countries found the only places open to dissent were radical mosques. Many turned to terror as a source of empowerment. And as a new century dawned, the violent currents swirling beneath the Middle East began to surface.
In the Holy Land, the dashed expectations resulting from the collapse of the Camp David peace talks had given way to the second intifada. Palestinian suicide bombers struck with horrific frequency and lethality. They murdered innocent Israelis at a pizza parlor, or aboard buses, or in the middle of a Passover Seder. Israeli Defense Forces responded with large-scale operations. And in 2001, more than 500 Israelis and Palestinians were killed.
Politically, the Palestinian Authority was led by a terrorist who stole from his people and walked away from peace. In Israel, Ariel Sharon was elected to fight terror and pursue a "Greater Israel" policy that allowed for no territorial concessions. Neither side could envision a return to negotiations or the realistic possibility of a two-state solution.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, Saddam Hussein had begun his third decade as the dictator of Iraq—a reign that included invading two neighbors, developing and using weapons of mass destruction, attempting to exterminate Marsh Arabs and many Kurds, paying the families of suicide bombers, systematically violating U.N. resolutions, and firing routinely at British and U.S. aircraft patrolling a no-fly zone.
Syria continued its occupation of Lebanon, with some 30,000 troops on Lebanese soil. Libya sponsored terror and pursued weapons of mass destruction. And in Iran, the prospect of reform was fading, the regime's sponsorship of terror continued, and its pursuit of nuclear weapons was largely unchecked.
Throughout the region, suffering and stagnation were rampant. The Arab Human Development Report revealed a bleak picture of high unemployment, poor education, high mortality rates for mothers, and almost no investment in technology. Above all, the Middle East suffered a deep deficit in freedom. Most people had no choice and no voice in choosing their leaders. Women enjoyed few rights. And there was little conversation about democratic change.
Against this backdrop, the terrorist movement was growing in strength and in ambition. For three decades, violent radicals had landed painful blows against America—the Iranian hostage crisis, the attacks on our embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103, the truck bombing of the World Trade Center, the attack on Khobar Towers, the bombing of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the strike on the USS Cole.
Post-9/11
And then came September the 11th, 2001, when 19 men from the Middle East carried out the worst attack on the United States since the strike on Pearl Harbor 67 years ago this weekend. In the space of a single morning, 9/11 etched a sharp dividing line in our history. We realized that we're in a struggle with fanatics pledged to our destruction. We saw that conditions of repression and despair on the other side of the world could bring suffering and death to our own streets.
With these new realities in mind, America reshaped our approach to the Middle East. We made clear that we will defend our friends, our interests, and our people against any hostile attempt to dominate the Middle East—whether by terror, blackmail, or the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We have carried out this new strategy by following three overriding principles.
First, we took the offense against the terrorists overseas. We are waging a relentless campaign to break up extremist networks and deny them safe havens. As part of that offensive, we pledged to strengthen our partnership with every nation that joins in the fight against terror. We deepened our security cooperation with allies like Jordan and Egypt, and with our friends in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, long a breeding ground for radicalism, has become a determined partner in the fight against terror—killing or capturing hundreds of al Qaeda operatives in the Kingdom. We dramatically expanded counterterrorism ties with partners in North Africa. And we left no doubt that America would stand by our closest ally in the Middle East—the state of Israel.
Second, we made clear that hostile regimes must end their support for terror and their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, or face the concerted opposition of the world.
This was the approach we took in Iraq. It is true, as I've said many times, that Saddam Hussein was not connected to the 9/11 attacks. But the decision to remove Saddam from power cannot be viewed in isolation from 9/11. In a world where terrorists armed with box cutters had just killed nearly 3,000 of our people, America had to decide whether we could tolerate a sworn enemy that acted belligerently, that supported terror, and that intelligence agencies around the world believed had weapons of mass destruction.
It was clear to me; it was clear to members of both political parties, and to many leaders around the world that after 9/11, that was a risk we could not afford to take. So we went back to the United Nations Security Council, which unanimously passed Resolution 1441 calling on Saddam Hussein to disclose, disarm, or face serious consequences. With this resolution, we offered Saddam Hussein a final chance to comply with the demands of the world. And when he refused to resolve the issue peacefully, we acted with a coalition of nations to protect our people and liberated 25 million Iraqis.
… When Saddam's regime fell, we refused to take the easy option and install a friendly strongman in his place. Even though it required enormous sacrifice, we stood by the Iraqi people as they elected their own leaders and built a young democracy. When the violence reached its most dire point, pressure to withdraw reached its height. Yet failure in Iraq would have unleashed chaos, widened the violence, and allowed the terrorists to gain a new safe haven—a fundamental contradiction to our vision for the Middle East.
So we adopted a new strategy and deployed more troops to secure the Iraqi people. When the surge met its objective, we began to bring our troops home under the policy of return on success. Yesterday, building on the gains made by the surge, the democratic government of Iraq approved two agreements with the United States that formalize our diplomatic, economic, and security ties and set a framework for the drawdown of American forces as the fight in Iraq nears its successful end.
After 9/11, we also confronted Libya over its weapons of mass destruction. The leader of Libya made a wise choice. In 2003, Colonel Qadhafi announced that he would abandon his weapons of mass destruction program. He concluded that the interests of his people would be best served by improving relations with America, and Libya turned over its nuclear centrifuges and other deadly equipment to the United States.
The defeat of Saddam also appears to have changed the calculation of Iran. According to our intelligence community, the regime in Tehran had started a nuclear weapons program in the late-1980s, and they halted a key part of that program in 2003. America recognized that the most effective way to … persuade Iran to … renounce its nuclear weapons ambitions was to have partners at our side, so we supported an international effort led by our allies in Europe. This diplomacy yielded an encouraging result when Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment.
Sadly, after the election of President Ahmadinejad, Iran reversed course and announced it would begin enriching again. Since then, we've imposed tough sanctions through United Nations resolutions. We and our partners have offered Iran diplomatic and economic incentives to suspend enrichment. We have promised to support a peaceful, civilian nuclear program. While Iran has not accepted these offers, we have made our bottom line clear: For the safety of our people and the peace of the world, America will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.
In Defense of Freedom
Third, America identified the lack of freedom in the Middle East as a principal cause of the threats coming from the region. We concluded that if the region continued on the path it was headed—if another generation grew up with no hope for the future, and no outlet to express its views—the Middle East would continue to simmer in resentment and export violence.
To stop this from happening, we resolved to help the region steer itself toward a better course of freedom and dignity and hope. We're engaged in a battle with the extremists that is broader than a military conflict, and broader than a law enforcement operation. We are engaged in an ideological struggle. And to advance our security interests and moral interests, America is working to advance freedom and democracy as the great alternatives to repression and terror.
As part of this effort, we're pressing nations across the region—including our friends—to trust their people with greater freedom of speech, and worship, and assembly. We're giving strong support to young democracies. We're standing with reformers, and dissidents, and human rights activists across the region. Through new efforts like the Middle East Peace Partnership Initiative and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, we're supporting the rise of vibrant civil societies…
We're encouraging Middle Eastern women to get involved in politics, and to start their own businesses, and take charge of their health through wise practices like breast cancer screening. Efforts like these extend hope to the corners of despair, and in this work we have had a lot of help, but no finer ambassador of goodwill than my wife, Laura Bush.
A Two-state Solution
…America has launched a sustained initiative to help bring peace to the Holy Land. At the heart of this effort is the vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. I was the first American President to call for a Palestinian state … and build[ing] support for the two-state solution has been a top priority of my administration.
To earn the trust of Israeli leaders, we made it clear that no Palestinian state would be born of terror; we backed Prime Minister Sharon's courageous withdrawal from Gaza, and we supported his decision to build a security fence, not as a political border but to protect the people from terror.
To help the Palestinian people achieve the state they deserve, we insisted on Palestinian leadership that rejects terror and recognizes Israel's right to exist. Now that this leadership has emerged, we're strongly supporting its efforts to build institutions of a vibrant, democratic state.
With good advice from leaders like former Prime Minister Tony Blair and Generals Jones, Dayton, Fraser, and Selva, the Palestinians are making progress toward capable security forces, a functioning legal system, government ministries that deliver services without corruption, and a market economy. In all our efforts to promote a two-state solution, we have included Arab leaders from across the region because we fully understand that their support will be essential for the creation of a state and lasting peace.
Last fall at Annapolis, Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab leaders came together at an historic summit. President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert agreed to launch direct negotiations on a peace agreement. Nations around the globe, including many in the Arab world, pledged to support them. The negotiations since Annapolis have been determined and substantial….
Vision for the Future
…The Middle East in 2008 is a freer, more hopeful, and more promising place than it was in 2001: For the first time in nearly three decades, the people of Lebanon are free from Syria's military occupation. Libya's nuclear weapons equipment is locked away in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Places like the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are emerging as centers of commerce… The regime in Iran is facing greater pressure from the international community than ever before. Terrorist organizations like al Qaeda have failed decisively in their attempts to take over nations. They're increasingly facing ideological rejection in the Arab world.
Iraq has gone from an enemy of America to a friend of America, from sponsoring terror to fighting terror, and from a brutal dictatorship to a multi-religious, multi-ethnic constitutional democracy. Instead of the Iraq we would see if a Saddam Hussein were in power—an aggressive regime vastly enriched by oil, defying the United Nations, bullying its Arab neighbors, threatening Israel, and pursuing a nuclear arms race with Iran—we see an Iraq emerging peacefully with its neighbors, welcoming Arab ambassadors back to Baghdad, and showing the Middle East a powerful example of a moderate, prosperous, free nation.
On the most vexing problem in the region—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—there is now greater international consensus than at any point in modern memory. Israelis, Palestinians, and Arabs recognize the creation of a peaceful, democratic Palestinian state is in their interests. And through the Annapolis process, they started down a path that will end with two states living side by side in peace.
In fits and starts, political and economic reforms are advancing across the Middle East. Women have run for office in several nations and been named to important government positions in Bahrain and Oman and Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Trade and foreign investment have expanded. Several nations have opened up private universities, and Internet use has risen sharply. Across the region, conversations about freedom and reform are growing louder. Expectations about government responsiveness are rising. And people are defying the condescending view that the culture of the Middle East is unfit for freedom.
There are still serious challenges facing the Middle East. Iran and Syria continue to sponsor terror. Iran's uranium enrichment remains a major threat to peace. Many in the region still live under oppression. Yet the changes of the past eight years herald the beginning of something historic and new. At long last, the Middle East is closing a chapter of darkness and fear, and opening a new one written in the language of possibility and hope. For the first time in generations, the region represents something more than a set of problems to be solved, or the site of energy resources to be developed. A free and peaceful Middle East will represent a source of promise, and home of opportunity, and a vital contributor to the prosperity of the world.
Those who ask what this future will look like need only look around. We see the new story of the Middle East in Iraqis waving ink-stained fingers, with Lebanese taking to streets in the Cedar Revolution. We see it in women taking their seats in elected parliaments, and bloggers telling the world their dreams. We see it in the skyscrapers rising above Abu Dhabi, and … thriving Middle Eastern businesses that are now connected to the global economy. We see it in a Saudi king sponsoring an interfaith dialogue, Palestinian reformers fighting corruption and terror, and Israelis who love their ancient land but want to live in peace.
These are striking images, and they do point the way to a brighter future. I believe the day will come when the map of the Middle East shows a peaceful, secure Israel beside a peaceful and democratic Palestine. I believe the day will come when people from Cairo and Riyadh to Baghdad and Beirut, to Damascus and Tehran, live in free and independent societies, bound together by the ties of diplomacy and tourism and trade. The day will come when al Qaeda and Hezbollah and Hamas are marginalized and then wither away, as Muslims across the region realize the emptiness of the terrorists' vision and the injustice of their cause.
[1] "President Bush Attends Saban Forum 2008," The White House, Dec. 5, 2008.
[2] "President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership," The White House, June 24, 2002.
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The Middle East Forum
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I would like to share and discuss more details but this open forum is a double-edged sword not to be miss-handled. I have a lengthly White Paper I submitted to DoD and DA shortly after 9/11, I began study of the looming Islamic Jihads beginning in the times of my C&GS course work days. I hesitate to up load the paper on your site because both of its length but also its contents. More later.
Rod
Posted by: Rod | May 20, 2009 at 01:56 AM
dear rod:
my email address is [email protected] .
i would very much like to read your paper and scholarship on these matters.
i would like to publish it main page, with authorship properly attributed to you, and i do not care about the length.
your observations in this post, and your comments and analysis, need to be before the public.
they are that important.
john jay
milton freewater, oregon
p.s. it is obvious, quite obvious, that you and mr. selbourne have all your knives and forks and linens in order, as well. laughing.
these last days, quite extraordinary for me, ... , to say the least.
Posted by: john jay | May 20, 2009 at 12:05 PM