summer patriot, winter soldier

still a toothless bear ...

russia: still a toothless bear after georgia.

on august 17, 2008, walter laquer submitted a brief monograph to harvard’s middle east strategy blog, middle east strategy at harvardhttp://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/, at the olin institute: weatherhead center for international affairs, discussing the geo-political reach of russia’s incursion into georgia.  in that article, entitled “russia and the middle east,” http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/08/russia_and_the_middle_east/, professor laquer argues that russia has benefited from its recent action, in that its neighbors and former subjects will now fear and respect her more, perhaps even as in the old glory days of the soviet union, and that western and american influence in the former eastern bloc and in the caucuses and the –stans is markedly damaged.

i did not agree with this assessment when i read the article, and do not agree with it upon reflection.

follows an analysis of the article i wrote for a friend, with whom I exchanged correspondence about the article, after she had forwarded it to me.--

this is a most interesting article.  i do not know if you are on the middle east strategy at harvard (m.e.s.h.) mailing list, but it would be quite interesting an interesting page to have on one’s mailing list.    there is at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/ a comment to the main article by walter laquer which is quite interesting, and which posits that the russians may be exposing themselves to forces which tend to the nationalistic breakup up and splintering of russia, wholly as much as exploiting geo-political opportunities for state expansion, and expansion of their interests into the middle east.

 before i reply to professor laquer's specific remarks, i am going to make some preliminary remarks of my own, which may help to provide an understanding of the framework controlling my analysis and view.  i was educated at whitman college by conservatives, several of whom were university of chicago educated, as undergrads and to be professional scholars in the u. chicago graduate schools.  they were extremely grounded in factual, historical and theoretical contexts as controlling how one looked at things.  also, as i get older, i take comfort in what marcus whitman, the murdered evangelical missionary to the walla walla indians and the namesake of the college, is reputed to have said, numerous times, as the story goes, and that is, "all my plans require time and distance:" as, indeed, all human endeavors require, as the russians will require in accomplishing those goals, and as the west will require in asserting its own geo-political interests while blunting russian expansionism, given a few needed deep breaths in this georgian adventure.

first, as to the far historical context.  --  russia is huge, but it governance has always been associated with a centralized and autocratic rule centered in moscow if we look at the city, or muscovy if we look at it as a provincial matter: the dominant population being muscovites, or "white russians."  the origins of the white russians is a matter not wholly clear, but legend has them as being of scandinavian origin, traveling up the great interior rivers into the region.  the problem with russian autocratic rule is that there has never been enough autocrats to govern the entire mess, so there has been a constant tension back and forth between the power asserted from the center and the power or resistance to centralized power exerted in the provinces: there have been, historically, two main ways that this relationship has played out.  one, the provincial populations have always made a heavy contribution of people and talents to the administrative center, and to the cultural center, a classic instance of imperial brain drain, e.g., the outer areas having their genius sucked into the administrative center.  persons from the provinces have, as a matter of fact, governed russia: stalin was a georgian seminarian, as a matter of fact, but apparently not a very good one, being a little wayward from his faith.  as an added irony, the first head of present day georgia was very high up in the soviet hierarchy before the collapse of the soviet regime.  two, the central authority has always relied heavily on hired gun cops to serve as a military or police function in keeping the provincials in line.  the romanoffs, for instance, favored the don & ukrainian cossacks as both palace guard and crushers of revolt and rebellion, while the soviets favored police apparatus such as the k.g.b., mr. putin's alma mater, to perform like functions.

russia has a great history.  but, russia, unfortunately, has never figured out this tension, and it has always been a source of the ebb and flow of the russian state, the waxing and waning of its political and historical strength, especially in exercising and keeping dominion over it provincial, …, well, dominions.

in some sense the matters in georgia are nothing more than this phenomenon in a contemporary context.  south ossetia lies in north georgia.  north ossetia lies in southern russia.  it is not horribly surprising that conflict should exist between russia and georgia over this region, especially given that georgia has been in the russian sphere of influence for many hundreds of years, and has been in russia and most recently in the soviet union for many years.  conflict between them is endemic.

 the near historical context. --  at its height, the soviet union occupied 1/6 of the earth’s land mass.  it was a huge country, with vast resources, very little of which could be extracted or exploited because of the extent of the land; the lack of communication and transportation infrastructure; the lack of population density over much of this landmass; its tremendous strain upon habitation because of weather conditions, long and hard winters, short growing seasons, and much of the land being encased in mud when not frozen, e.g., the taiga; and the stupidities and inefficiencies of the soviet planned economies.

the soviets broke up.  to this day, in a typical exercise of russian paranoia, they attribute this to the machinations of the united states, rather than their own failings.  but, the nickels and dimes lie at their doorsteps.

 when the soviet union collapsed, it was bankrupt, dead broke.  it could not pay its bureaucrats for their labor, and it could not pay its servicemen, nor in a lot of instances in the outer regions of the country, could it even feed or house its servicemen and their family.  oft times when paid, they were paid in a script more worthless than the russian ruble was at the time.

 the soviet union collapsed, and the soviets were ejected from many regions and countries who simply did not want anything more to do with the russians. they were essentially kicked out right along with the ejectment and overthrow of the puppet provincial soviets by the indigenous populations.  soviet bureaucracy and military might disintegrated, their influence and control over the provinces withered away into nothing, and the soviet regimes put in place by the russians were deposed.

let us put this in some perspective.

this was not the result of great upheaval between the russians and their dominions.  the russians were not, for instance, run out of georgia, ukraine, armenia and the great -stans by armed revolt, though some of their provincial soviet regimes were treated rather ignominiously.  nor, were the communists and socialistic politicians, former bureaucrats, and academicians set in place for 70 years necessarily ejected or killed by outraged partisan populations: for the most part, they were there, and stayed as you might expect people to stay after 70 years of rule.

 let us put this into some further perspective.

 you should look very closely as the photographs in your wonderful posts on georgia.  look at the russian troops.  they are in the most rudimentary uniforms, the uniforms being of all types, none matching, some of the troops wearing winter wool pants, others (and i just noticed this yesterday) wearing tennis shoes and sports sneakers, without helmets or flack dress, and wearing all kinds of boots and the like.

 the troops do not even have the basic indications of insignia of rank or function on their uniforms.  it is very hard to identify officers and noncoms amongst them.  and, if you will notice, in many of the photographs, the russian troops are wearing little white strands of cloth wrapped around their uniformed arms, on either side, which i take was an informal tag adopted by the troops so that they could distinguish themselves from the georgian defenders, many of who would have been outfitted just as they, as a military part and parcel of the soviet union.

 look at the pictures of the invading military hardware.  there are involved very few main battle tanks, more light infantry tanks, and a preponderance of armored personnel carriers, tracked and wheeled, and a few sundry trucks.  nowhere is there depicted any large soviet remnant columns moving around the Georgian countryside, it is mostly five or six or seven vehicles and a sundry truck or two moving about.

 as noted in the comment i sent in on that post the indications were not of large scale engagements, but of a piecemeal engagement of the georgians, in which the soviets probably had the advantage of a pretty thorough job of intel on the part of its "peacekeepers" to locate and identify georgian forces, which advantage the georgians did not enjoy against the russians.

 why do i mention this?

 until the last few years, and the development of their oil trade, russia was dead broke, and her military was destitute.  i mean dead broke.  and, nonfunctioning, a condition in which many of its vaunted division existing mostly on paper and in military parking lots.  had the russians been able to exert any authority militarily or governmentally over its provinces, it would have stayed in them.  but, it could not.  so it left.

 this is the context in which russia invaded georgia.

not as a superpower.

and, when russia gets done invading georgia, it will not have suddenly been transformed into a superpower. 

its military is still in shambles.  its units are mostly what are called "skeleton" units, characterized by paper organizational charts without the necessary conscripts or manpower to fill unit designations, and its equipment, which is old and decrepit, parked in regimental and divisional parking lots.  certain units, near moscow and the key cities, will be in better shape, with better uniforms, more powerful and up to date equipment, but they are not a very imposing military, as compared to the united states, and even as compared to the joint force of the europeans.

the soviet remnant invaded georgia with a rag tag military, undermanned and with inferior equipment and very little by way of logistical or supply train, and when they get done overrunning georgia, they will still have a rag tag military, undermanned and with inferior equipment and very little by way of a logistical or supply train, and this is why they will not push forward into syria or iran any time soon.  they would have a hard time doing it without being opposed, they just have no ability to move stuff on a large scale basis, and that goes for armor, infantry, artillery, and especially in terms of air power.  they are a second rate or third rate military power, and any objective understanding of their recent past, and any critical look at their invasion effort should support that conclusion.

as i have said many times, i do not see them able to project military power into the middle east, or into the former caucus republics such as ukraine, and others, if met by any significant opposition by the n.a.t.o. allies or the united states.  for the russians to think that they could go toe to toe against american armor and infantry is pretty much laughable, especially given that american air superiority would dominate the tactical and strategic battlefield.

but, as we have also discovered, the soviets have found that the euro's will stand for nothing.  and, that the americans can be pushed, if not pushed too hard at any one time.

 so, it is within this context, long winded that it is, that i undertake to look at professor laquer's remarks.

i think, in the main, the professor does not give due weight to the soviet need for "time and distance" in which to achieve their aims.  for all the alarmist cries that have gone up all over the world, and, even i must admit on my own computer screen, it has only been about ten days since all of this started.  that is hardly time to effect geo-political change on the world.

 what have, in point of actual fact, the russians accomplished?  they have run the bully's roughshod over a country which had very little resource by which to resist the soviet onslaught.  and, what does this roughshod treatment (and, by the way, this is a horribly apt description, because that is exactly what the soviet forces were, roughshod, ill clad and rag tag) signify about the actual military status of the soviet union/russia, in the real world?  well, look at in terms of military might, it shows that the soviet union/russia is still not a military apparatus that could contend with the west, were the west possessed of the wherewithal to stand against the soviets.

because of the recent monetary and fiscal woes of the russians, though they may have done military research and development while in the doldrums, this has not been reflected in the deployment of any major military systems, at least not having to do with armor, artillery, or other mechanized infantry systems; nor have any advanced airplanes or avionics or aerial weapons systems been developed that have been deployed; and, its navy lies in either vladivostok or in north sea ports, largely decommissioned hulks or mothballed.

 this is not going to suddenly change in the coming months or even in the coming years.

the russians have discovered one thing out of all of this, however, and that is the propaganda value of bluster, bluff, intimidation and big talk.  they have witnessed what the iranians have done militarily against the west, and what they have accomplished diplomatically by bluff and bluster, all the while possessing almost no legitimate military power to any appreciable degree.  it would not take the united states much time at all to reduce iranians military to a battered mess, all with the expenditure of very few american lives.

 they have discovered that this bluff and bluster is confused as substance in the west, that posturing and grabbing one balls in theatrical defiance of one's foe's is confused by the western press as being of substance.

 so, for instance, some puffed up russian general has threatened poland with nuclear attack if it deploys an american missile system and allows america to build a base upon polish soil.  yesterday, or today, condi rice did something without apparently fucking it up beyond all belief, and poland and the united states signed an agreement to go ahead with the construction of the base, and the placing of american missiles upon polish soil.

 so, let us address professor laquer's remarks, as they appear in his paper.

 the professor opens his remarks by contending many of the russian/soviet aims in the former -stans can be accomplished without military or bureaucratic occupation, and presumably without setting up puppet soviet republics as in the old days, simply by intimidation.  so much is probably true, and probably not too much to be alarmed about.  there is not too much in the former soviet –stans that anyone in the west has perceived as having strategic or material value, so in strictly geo-political terms, who cares?  this hardly amounts to empire, does it?

 while saying that, professor laquer recognizes that soviet/russian hegemony is in all probability not to be extended into the baltic regions, e.g., estonia, lithuania, latvia, which, while he doesn't mention it, are members of the european union, and nato, if memory serves me correctly.  though he denigrates the european resolve to withstand russian expansionistic tendencies, apparently he still recognizes in the euro's sufficient resolve to come to the aid of member states of the european union, and of n.a.t.o.  this is a direct recognition of the fallacy of his argument, in my opinion, and a matter which is glossed over very quickly by the good professor.

this, in and of itself, is a direct recognition that soviet expansionism occurs upon if not the tacit approval of the european states than at least upon its active acquiescence.  this is a caution that the professor's seeming enthusiasm for the prospects of soviet expansion into europe, and into the former eastern bloc nations, is to be taken with a grain of salt.

 his predictions in so far as the ukraine and moldavia being very hesitant to stand up to the soviets bears some examination.  the ukraine was the former bread basket of the soviet union, and the home of the don cossacks: it is a great grain growing region, much akin to our own midwest.  and, the ukraine was a substantial part and contributor to any financial health as experienced by the soviet union.

i think the good professor is guilty of an intellectual sin when he equates the ukrainian positions with that of the georgians.  ukraine is home to kiev, one of the major cities of europe, and sevastopol, a city on the black sea which has port facilities leased to the russian black sea fleet.  the ukraine has a population of some 46 million people, about 75% of whom share a common ethnicity, and most of whom are orthodox christians: this does not compare unfavorably with russia's population of about 142 million people, spread out over 1/8 of the world's land mass.

moreover, the ukrainians had europe’s second largest military, second only to that of russia, at the breakup of the soviet union. though the manpower of the ukraine military is now reduced, the ukraine still has a military force of about 300-350,000 men, down from a force level of 780,000 while part of the soviet union: it must be comprehended, therefore, as having a pretty substantial ready reserve of trained men at its disposal.  it had at one time the world 3rd largest nuclear arsenal but gave that up as a signatory to the s.t.a.r.t. treaties, and is currently not acknowledged to have any nuclear weapons.  (you don't suppose they have any tucked away, anyplace, do you?)

 i do not think the urkrainians quaking in their boots over the russian incursion into georgia.  certainly, such adventurism would not be lightly regarded by the ukrainians, who have long ties of both friendship and animosity with the russians, but i think the ukrainian military assessment would have to be that the rag tag group that invaded georgia would not have such a free hand with their own forces.  and, as exists with the baltic states, though ukraine is not a member of nato or the euro union, it has greater ethnic, social and geo-political ties with europe than georgia apparently was able to call upon.

 i think the ukrainians likely to be of more ability to antagonize russia that the good professor admits, and much more readily capable and disposed to defy russian desires of expansion into and conquest of those territories now ruled by the ukraine.  i do not see the ukraine being pushed around or influenced into the russian camp by russia’s recent invasion of georgia, as intimated by professor laquer.

as to the impact that this georgian matter will have in the former eastern bloc states, it seems to me that the good professor overstates his case significantly, again.

now, on the one hand he says that the europeans are of no matter in this area, and that neither the russians nor the eastern europeans are likely to give them much truck or pay much attention to them, the euro's having been lapsing into insignificance for a good long while.  yet, what did the good professor say of the baltic region?  why, precisely the opposite:

 The Baltic republics on the other hand are weak but indigestible; military occupation is ruled out, the game is not worth the candle.

well, if they are so damned weak, wherein lies the risk of a georgian style foray into the baltic states, because, surely, their reach to the sea is of almost incalculable worth to the russians, a plum ripe for picking, as it were.  the trouble is, of course, that little detail already mentioned, that being the membership of lithuania, estonia and latvia in the european union, and in n.a.t.o.  so i guess maybe europe is not entirely toothless in the russian perception, according to the good professor.   he would have it both ways, but he cannot, and in the end he has to acknowledge that were the russians, at this time and within this context blunted and confronted by a resolute europe, then the russians would have to give way.

 this is not a mere inconsistency in the professor's argument, a little tear in the cuffs, this is a rent crotch in the pantaloons of his position. 

 now, just whom the professor favors in all of this is a little nebulous, but as a good machiavellian he advises the soviet/russian behemoth to proceed with historical patience and not haste in its expansion to geo-political world power status, in the caucus and in the middle east:

 Ideally, the restoration of the Russian sphere of domination (or at least influence) should proceed gradually, even slowly. It was Stalin's mistake after World War Two that he proceeded hastily, which generated resistance, including the emergence of NATO

 this is a dead giveaway.  this is an implicit acknowledgment that if the soviet remnant is challenged in its expansion via georgia, it has neither the conventional military strength nor the monetary wealth, or as a player which aspires as a country to exert geo-political might, or as a would be again empire, to push the matter forward.  And, under no circumstances, could the russians push their way through an american military standing in their path. 

not now.

he talks of russian military strategists predicting war with the united states in 10 or 15 years.  this may be an accurate timeline for the chinese to think they can take us on, and they have embarked on a building program enabling them to be able to do so should they deem it in their best interests, but even they don't seem that eager.  and, i don't think the russians even remotely have the ability to building their military to such a state in a mere ten or 15 years: the economic and demographic indicators just are not there.  the fact is, that demographically and economically, the russians are enjoying an unseasonable spring bloom for the time being, but that the bloom will quickly wear off the russian rose as declining natural resources and demographic burdens such as a low birth rate, high incidence of alcoholism, a virulent tuberculin epidemic, and the combination of a very high islamic immigration and birthrate perform the same double whammy on the russians as it is in europe.  indeed, in the “dissent” to professor laquer’s article mentioned and linked above, that author suggested that the middle east and islam are coming to russia, and not the other way around.

here is the crux of the matter, insofar as the good professor's arguments and sentiments go, and again, here is where i think he gives way the intellectual game:

What will be the impact of these trends on the Middle East? Ideally, it would be wise to wait with any major action in the area until Russian domination in its closer neighborhood is established. But if opportunities for a Russian return to the Middle East arise, they should be used.  ...

The main aim will be to weaken America's position in the Middle East.  ...

 The attack on South Ossetia provided Russia with an unique opportunity; ... .

 Such opportunities will not frequently return, and other opportunities will have to be created by the Kremlin—probably by exploiting existing conflicts such as those in the Middle East.

 in short, the russians were gifted with a chance to extend their reach a little bit by diplomatic blunders exercised by condi rice and nicholas sarkozy over the invasion of georgia, but the russians should not expect that to happen to their benefit as a matter of continuing course.

in other words, removing the professorial gloss from his analysis, the russians do not have now and will not likely have in the foreseeable future, the wherewithal to press their way into the middle east unless unopposed by the west, and unless they can exploit regional conflict in the middle east and find the west with their collective pants and will to resist down, as it has proven the case in georgia.

 in essence, it will be wise for the russians to wait on trying to exploit their success in georgia, won against a weak and defenseless foe, for all practical purposes, rather than taking the west on directly at this point, because they do not have the military and economic power to carry off such a conflict.  in other, less academic, words, the united states would kick the living shit out of the russians right now, if the russians could find a way in which their behaviors would be sufficiently provocative to force the united states to bring the full brunt of its military upon the russians.

 there is a little secret in all of this, seldom discussed.  but, while the united states is depicted and described as being pushed all over the board all over the world, ... , it is all over the world, projecting power into its farthest reaches, and influencing politics all over the world.  we are, by contrast to most of the world, very secure within our own borders, with our underlying economies and societies in good shape, functioning, and reasonably anticipated to remain so into the foreseeable future.  georgia borders russia, has been part of russia for centuries, while we are new to the world,  and, while our influence in georgia has not been proven determinative in any sense of the word, neither has it been negligible, but a recognized influence.

i am not an admirer of american diplomacy in this whole thing.  had we reacted quickly and decisively, I think we could have pushed the russian incursion right back into russian, and had we moved the assets into position quickly to do so, i think the russians would have left georgia very quickly.  i think that rice and sarkozy pushed a “ceasefire” agreement down the Georgian throats that not even the russians had the temerity to demand at first.  in short, i think sarkozy and rice forced a russian occupation upon georgian that the russians were not inclined to demand, except upon their recognition of the west’s stupidity in the gift of condi rice’s persons.

but, this circumstance does not make russia either a superpower, or a country able to project power globally in any geo-political sense.  it just make condi rice stupid, hardly a unique circumstance.

the final comment on the good professor's article is this.  he admits that for the soviets/russians/tsarists to make any inroads into the middle east, opportunities will have to present themselves.

in other words, they cannot force their way in, it will have to await the u.s. ejectment from the region for other reasons, or have the willful acquiescence of the united states for the soviet remnant nosing their limited way back into the region.

 i saw today where the chinless assad is in russia hoping to buy weapons, and the russians are hoping to work a deal for a mediterranean port for their navy.  now, some may quake and quail over this, and talk about the soviets projecting power into the mediterranean.  but, this perception is based again, not within the context of soviet & russian military history, economic history, or current fact.

it is based upon an emotional reaction to largely symbolic and propagandistic posturing on the part of the soviet remnant and syria.

right now, the russians do not have a blue water navy, capable of exercising strategic power.  they have a carrier which is capable of carrying 17 fighter planes, and is not capable of being at sea much more than a week under full steam, before having to be refueled, and cannot stay at sea much longer than a month before having to return to port for repairs and stores.  they have one aircraft carrier as the back bone of a navy, which carrier has been in port under repair for more than half its existence since being commissioned.  the carrier had its keel laid in 1985, and was commissioned in approximately 2004.  they have no other carriers presently being built.

it will be a long time, a very long time, before russia can exert a naval influence in her near coastal waters, let alone push into the med.

 and, as an historical fact, they have never been able to figure out how to use a navy.

 they are not going to be able to make themselves into a world power by cutting deals with a fellow with no chin, at least not today, and not tomorrow, and probably not for a long time.

 john jay

georgia on my mind ....

russia has put troops onto georgian soil.  it is quiet obvious that putin and friends do not envision russia as debilitated forever.  and, that they see one way to not stay debilitated forever is to seek control of a region through which it is anticipated that great wealth will flow, and from which great wealth will be generated: from the flow of oil, cash flow, and all that, doncha know.  despite what the leftist hanky wringers in the west think about the demise of power politics and geo-political realities, those realities control the conduct of great actors in the world.  it is the height of folly to think that the u.s., because of the power it has attained from that very process, is immune from it. 

john jay @ 08.08.2008

gnawing lions

prologue.  have you ever contemplated killing a 450 pound male african lion with your teeth? 

well, if you are a 400 pound male lion looking to take over the aging ruler’s pride of females you sure have, finding it not a task undertaken lightly.  even for a lion.

male lions are awesome creatures, nature’s answer, for lions, to the problems posed by hyenas.  to watch a film of a pack of hyena’s harassing and chasing female lions off of a kill, one concludes that hyenas are formidable in their own right, and bring considerable assets to such a confrontation besides bluff and bluster.  when hyenas in sufficient number take on females lions, they have fighting skills, weapons and courage sufficient that even the lion females do not wish to test in serious fighting, and hyenas can and do kill lions.

until the male lion who dominates the pride arrives.  and then the summary killing of hyenas begins, for such is the killing power of the male lion that it really isn’t fighting, …, if the male can catch a hyena, he kills it instantly, and then searches for his next victim, and he kills summarily, almost perfunctorily, until the hyenas flee.

even such prowess fades with age, but, not instantly, not as a matter precisely delineated, and not by the tendered resignation of the male into a well deserved retirement.  no, the boss lion is deposed and demoted by his murder, by younger and newly stronger male rivals: even our own mafia is placid by comparison.  and, he who would be king must figure out how to kill an animal with a battle array of teeth and claw capable of summarily dispatching hyenas with a quick chomp and a contemptuous toss of the head.  a dominant male stays the dominant male just so long as he is not supplanted by his murderer … , no more, no less.

how does a male lion kill another male lion?

a moment’s reflection should suggest “very carefully” as an answer.  the problem is the very proximity required to an intended victim’s teeth and claws, for with massive shoulders and legs and claws that look nothing so much as a line backer’s arms approaching an opponent with murderous zeal for the tackle to grasp and grip with, and with incisors that rip asunder tissue as a steel talon, anytime one lion gets close enough to another to kill it, he is himself exposed to crippling or fatal injury: go for your victim’s throat, and you risk having your own ripped out precisely as you kill your victim.

your death as an assailant can be suffered in the flick of an eye, and what must be considered very closely by the lion assassin, is the fact that he must also kill without being meaningful injured: a tattered ear is not too large a price to pay for a rival’s death, but a punctured shoulder or chest or neck or a fractured jaw insures death from in a most unpleasant manner, in the jaws of another lion or by hyenas.

it turns out, not surprisingly, that the way to the safest kill lies at the end of the lion without teeth, and that is at the end of the lion to which the tail is attached. in short, the butt end is the weak spot of the lion who is to be victim: his flank proves to be his vulnerable flank.  how apt the phrase, in this case.

as a consequence, a curious fighting style has evolved between male lions seriously trying to kill each other.  the threatened males sit on their haunches and try to tuck them under and out of the way as much as possible, all the while twisted around to present their heads and teeth to the aspect where this weaponry normally ain’t, their butts. the attacker, by contrast, attempts to deliver fatal bites to the victim’s rear and pelvis, where he is most vulnerable, and where he is least capable of defending.  (males who work in partnership in such affairs will wait to a later day to settle any differences as may emerge between them.  being born a male lion is not a fast track to longevity.)  it is a most curious looking affair, and a very odd posture by which to engage in mortal combat, but the logic of the matter dictates it.  for, if they were to face off, … , well, face to face, the fight would probably prove very quickly fatal to one of the combatants, and perhaps more slowly to the others because of injury, there being simply too much weaponry to bring to bear not somehow fatal to both.  for, if you are a lion, while you are biting your fellow combatant he is biting you, will equally telling and severe consequences over the long run.

and, the logic of it in terms of the species and safety of the pride demands a healthy survivor, to protect the other lions.

so,  the attackers maneuver and twist around looking for the quick wound to the adversary’s hips looking then to back off and duck away before being  themselves injured, content at that juncture to leave the dying victim to his own devices.  challenging lions mean business, when it comes time to depose the leader of the pride, and to take over his breeding privileges, murder is the only way, as the ruler will not abdicate: to the victor goes the spoils.

it is rather like geo-politics, in a very real sense, but is it exactly like geo-politics? 

an upstart nation or civilization or religion looks for a declining and decreasingly formidable opponent to dispatch, without being destroyed itself in the process.  as in nature so in politics, and the idea suggested by the above might be to survive the process in such a manner as to be capable of enjoying the fruits of one’s conquest, as a reward for the considerable risk undertaken.  as in all things, the calculus suggested is that the benefits accrued be commensurate with the risks undertaken to obtain them.

it would seem from this perspective that always victory is preferable, but not to be gained by too great a cost.  and, it would seem to follow that defeat suggests death.

this paper is an examination, perhaps not entirely satisfactory in all particulars, whether these assumptions hold true in all circumstances,  and whether these assumptions dictate the behavior of actor on the geo-political stage, in all circumstances.

do the metaphors provided by the lions provide perfect guidance in understanding the behaviors of either nation states or other groups bent on conquest?

to the issue at hand.   pamela geller has written a very good post at atlasshrugs2000, at the following link: http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2008/08/apocalypse-now.html , in which she links and considers a recent editorial written by john bolton, in its entirety, (which is what i like especially about atlasshrugs,) and with regard to the nuclear weapons program launched by iran and the putative diplomatic efforts by the west to stop it.

mr. bolton argues, quite persuasively to my mind, that iran is not very impressed by this diplomatic effort because it is, in keeping with the context of my earlier remarks, quite toothless, and fearing no teeth,  iran will not tuck its tail and submit.  he notes that previous diplomatic efforts, characterized by the presence of “deadlines” which are not imposed, were not likely to and have not as a matter of fact deterred iran from proceeding apace with its stated goals of achieving a nuclear weapons production and delivery system.  for her part, ms. geller quite brilliantly sets forth from another linked source a history of those deadlines set by the west and violated with absolute impunity, and notes very ably that the muslims have stated their goals of the destruction of the west much as adolf hitler did in mein kampf.  it is a very able post, very persuasively and cogently done, and with which i am in almost total agreement: this is not unusual for me, as ms. geller seldom misses the mark on such matters, as far as i am concerned.

it seems to me that in all of this we may be tempted simply look to iran, and to islam, in the exercise of its statecraft as the younger lion looking to depose a decaying and aging west, and as a lion of state having given considerable thought as to how to go about it, and subject to the assumptions and rules of the process as noted above.  and, here, i do something i very seldom do, and depart just a bit from pamela geller’s position in the matter.  not very substantially, perhaps just in the form of a cautionary caveat, for i do not think my thinking is at substantial variance from hers, it is  just that i consider it expedient  to consider, as an intellectual exercise, whether there is another way of looking at it, if just for a bit.

ms. geller notes that the doctrine of “mutually assured destruction” holds little application in a situation in which one side of the equation, islam, cares not a whit for the death of perhaps millions of its adherents if the religion might/may emerge as victorious after a nuclear exchange with the west, or if the west does not entirely annihilate islam after it shall have attacked israel with nuclear weapons.  and, in an earlier post at this blog, “war and logic,” i have concluded the same.  http://wintersoldier2008.typepad.com/summer_patriot_winter_sol/2008/05/war-and-logic.html .   i do not depart from that analysis, nor do i criticize ms. geller in the slightest for voicing her analysis with regard to mutually assured destruction having no application to the situation presented in the middle east: as stated, i agree with that.

but, there may be a subtlety involved here.  a little twist in the time line, as it were, presented by the circumstance of iran nearing completion of her goal to have deliverable nuclear weapons, and the fact of the upcoming presidential election in the united states.

the near behavior of iran may suggest, may seduce us into believing that she is acting in conformity with principles comfortable to us in the west, which seem “rational” to us, when in fact she is not.

it might prove worthwhile, as a conceptual tool, and if only for a bit, to consider whether iran/islam has concluded that taking the west and israel head on might not be the only way to go about defeating the west, the united states and israel, rather than by inflicting upon the west crippling blows at the portion of its anatomy least susceptible to defense, as it were, is a more profitable and less damaging alternative presented to islam by which to gain the demise of the west.

in other words, we ought to examine quite closely the notion whether iran has considered another way to defeat the west through diplomatic and other political maneuverings which suggests that she will not use nuclear weapons if allowed to attain the capacity to make them and deliver them, or if she obtains them otherwise.

is there any analysis which presents itself or suggests that nuclear war is not inevitable once iran obtains deliverable nuclear weapons? 

it is a matter worth considering.  If the answer is yes, then some alternative to a pre-emptive strike, conventional or nuclear, to take out iran’s nuclear weapons systems might be preferable.  if the answer is negative, if it is a resounding no, then no alternatives to a pre-emptive strike exist, and such a strike should be delivered, the sooner the better.

please see http://wintersoldier2008.typepad.com/summer_patriot_winter_sol/2008/05/war-and-logic.html .  

i have written in other contexts that it is not an irrational thing for islam to note that the west has attained its pre-eminent position in the world politically, economically, materially and diplomatically by fighting a series of very deadly wars, chiefly between its competing western nations for dominance of world markets, spheres of influence, and the acquisition and dominance of competing foreign empires.  these wars and the events leading up to them have produced fluctuating alliances, incredibly complex foreign policies , and have produced ever increasing savagery fueled by technological advancement, itself spurred by the exigencies of war and the pressures to advance strategically in industrial and military science.  for islam to conclude from an examination of these circumstances, that if islam wants admittance into the resulting elite circles it is simply going to have to engage in a similar pattern to attain similar lofty goals, is not illogic nor irrational: it is simply one way to view history.  indeed, such an assessment and observation is based upon pretty sound logic, e.g., as an example of such thinking, it is logical to conclude that a nation does not gain an elevated position in the military sciences without having blooded its military structure from time to time: one gains skills in things that one has experience in.

the west in pre-eminent in the military end of things amongst the nations of the world, because the west has simply engaged in more active and destructive warfare in the past century and a half or so than have the other nations.  wealth, industrial capacity, the application of science and modes of production to war material and capital, have all contributed to making the west pre-eminent in the last century plus.  practice makes perfect.

--it must be asked and considered, is islam simply emulating the west in its drive for nuclear weapons, and once she has them, will she act in conformity with western behaviors and attitudes about them, as have other nations associated with islam, such as pakistan and india.  this is a monumentally important question.  if it would appear that islamic fundamentalism poses dangers not inherent in the possession of such weapons by western or communist nations, then we must reassess allowing a nation such as pakistan to have them, should she come under the control of a politics similar to iran’s.--

but, islam has also noted that its contemporary efforts to gain in such military and geo-political skills have met with shattering defeat and disappointment, both in the eras of turkish colonialism and as followed by european colonialism and conquest, and the contemporaneous islamic attempts to be shed of such domination, and in the era of defeat after defeat after humiliating defeat at the hands of the israeli’s.

again, to make use of a rather elaborate metaphor, islam has not found much success or succor at the toothy end of the western lion.  so, is it illogic and imprudent to simply look at iran’s drive to obtain nuclear weapons as a way to avoid conflict with the west militarily while being able to use such weapons as a means of extracting foreign policy and other political concessions.  if so, it may be equally prudent to inquire precisely what such ends may be?  (it is a short inquiry.  always, the aims are the destruction of israel, and ejecting the west from the middle east.)

it may very well be that iran and islam simply seek in the possession of a deliverable nuclear weapons system a counterpoise to the still yet massive military might of the west, a west which has dominated it for centuries, and a west which has dealt it humiliating military defeat after humiliating military defeat over a like period.  certainly, the contemporary west even in its social and political infirmity, as divided as its politics are by internal attack from the left, has pretty much manhandled islam the world over on almost every occasion where islam has chosen to go toothy muzzle and nose to toothy muzzle and nose with the west., and that would include all of the wars versus israel and the recent campaigns of the united states in iraq and afghanistan against islamic governments and al queda and the taliban and the like.  i am even given to understand that the french military, of all institutions, did not acquit itself so very poorly in algeria, but tossed in the towel politically and socially in that fight against islam.  (the military campaigns of islam against the russians in chechnya and afghanistan cannot be considered western defeats, as we aided fundamentalist islam there, of all things.  and, the diplomatic victories of islam in the balkans and serbia were also aided by the west.  go figure.)

in stark contrast, western diplomacy has to be considered inept in countering the aims of islam, as time after time western diplomacy has proven either toothless or strangely enabling of islamic terror, and islamic attempts at conquest.

is iran’s attempt to build a deliverable nuclear weapon simply an attempt to further aid and buttress a rather formidable diplomatic course as followed by islam?  does iran simply intend to further exploit a west rendered functionally toothless and incapable of defending itself, (and in this i include israel) because it is shorn of its intellectual and moral conviction to use its considerable weaponry in defense of itself?

and, it is precisely here that islam, and iran, especially, have proven adept time after time in biting the west, looking for that final bite which will cripple the west.

pamela geller has put the matter this way, which is her usual and succinct  way of stating that which i have struggled to in this article.  she writes:

while all this dhimmi "dithering" continues and we stumble towards an apocalyptic storm, there will come a day, an hour where president bush will face the difficult decision. after the election and before the inauguration of the next president, there will come a moment when he will have to choose to save the free world and stand up to the world's as well as obambi and co.'s condemnations (although the history books will look most kindly at bush, if west writes them that is) or he will falter, and the price will be unthinkable.  [edited.]  : http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2008/08/apocalypse-now.html 

i have come to the conclusion that president bush will not attack iran, (and therefore disagree with pamela to this limited extent, as she holds out hope that he will attack iran) nor even set the operational planning in motion for the same, because he is afflicted with the malady known as “the bay of pigs syndrome.”  since that large and showy failure at the beginning of the john kennedy  presidency, presidents have been pathologically reluctant to burden a succeeding administration with an operation not of its own design.  president bush would now have to launch an attack on short notice and short planning, with an administration sharply divided on the wisdom of such an attack, and he would not have sufficient time to launch follow up attacks as needed to secure the mission.  and, again, he will not hand such an operation in place to his successor, he will not repeat the circumstances leading to a “bay of pigs” disaster.  simply bad form in the presidential set, doncha know.

i think it conventional wisdom to avoid such things, at all costs, and I think president bush content to follow such conventional wisdom.

i believe the iranians recognize this, and they have very skillfully exploited this american phobia, this desire not to experience “the bay of pigs” experience from time to time, in a very nervy  and savvy game of brinksmanship and outright small scale assault on united states interests and policies.  they have avoided direct large scale conflict, in which they would be no less decisively defeated than was saddam hussein when he went nose to nose with the united states militarily.

it is this savvy brinksmanship which suggests to some that iran is simply playing western diplomacy better than the west, that the drive to the bomb is simply an extension of that clever diplomacy, and that they really don’t intend to use the bomb but to exploit its considerable diplomatic worth.

indeed, i have suggested it prudent that we consider as an intellectual possibility that iran’s conduct to this point a diplomatic version of trying to expel the west and the united states from the middle east by conducting the conflict as one in which iran takes successive bites and chomps at the hips and butt of the west, while studiously avoiding direct major contact with the u.s. military. and, within this context, this policy might also appear an application of such a scheme against the interests of an indigenous western europe, and, to a limited extent,  the soviet remnant.  in this regard, iran’s behavior might simply be regarded as the normal bluff and posturing and threat this represents to european strategic interests.

this is a potentially rational way to conceptualize iranian actions right up to the point where they acquire the bomb, or nearly so, as before that point they could back away from the dynamic set forth in my piece “war and logic.” 

please see.—

 http://wintersoldier2008.typepad.com/summer_patriot_winter_sol/2008/05/war-and-logic.html .   [yes, i want you to read it, which is why i have inserted the link so often.  this is admitted.  it is lengthy, it is difficult is you are a casual reader, but it has some points to make, which you should consider.] –

we should consider as an intellectual proposition whether iran’s attainment and possession of a nuclear weapons delivery system is compatible with normal state behavior as defined and delineated by the diplomatic history between the west and its adversaries, … , such history denoted by the rubric phrase “the cold war.”  in short, can iran have a nuclear weapon without using it?

i think the answer “no.”  in plain english, my own analysis leads me to conclude that if iran obtains the weapons systems she will use them, and first upon israel, based upon her own calculus that the west will not retaliate against her with nuclear weapons.  further, that emboldened with such success, she will attack the west with them in localized theatres of war.  please read “war and logic,” linked above.

again, iran’s behavior to this point, to some within our state department, suggests the possibility that she will behave “normally” in possession of nuclear weapons.  this has to be the operative assumption behind recent attempts to “negotiate” diplomatically with iran.

this seems to me a snare and a delusion, an obscuring chimera constructed by intellects and emotions that do not want to confront the truths associated with a nation and a set of leaders whose announced politic al and religious goals are consonant with the use of the weapon, and who have promised the use of the weapon.

i reject the view that iran engages in diplomacy and will continue to do so.

iran engages in war and will continue to do so, including nuclear war if she has the capacity to do so.

the view of iran as simply trying another diplomatic tack to defeat the west by using the threat of a bomb as a diplomatic tool by which to damage the west has had very limited diplomatic utility to this juncture, and just simply looses any utility whatsoever once iran comes into possession of meaningful systems of delivering a working bomb.  prior to obtaining the weapons systems, before then, the iranians could use nuclear weapons as have apparently the north koreans, that being a means to extract diplomatic and monetary concessions and aid from the west to prop up its failed economic system.  we are to the point now, however, we were simply must acknowledge by their continuing enterprise and expenditure of funds, the vast efforts devoted to manufacturing a bomb and obtaining the industrial plant enabling them to do so, that the iranians are simply to have the bomb.

it is odd.

a male lion has an individual life span of what, … , ?? , … , five or six years if lucky, a couple months if he succumbs to the very brutal numbers of survival as a cub?  and, death comes quickly at all points along the way.  yet, when it comes to killing another male, to gain supremacy over a pride and insure the replication of his identify and gene structure, a male lion has all the time in the world, and goes about it very methodically, if not entirely patiently, so as to insure he survives the exercise.  he would live to assure the fruits of his labor.

humans live forever, comparatively speaking, and islam has lived for 1400 years.

so, again, it seems odd that just when islam has found the technique to attack the west in the place where it has no teeth, from the rear through diplomacy and demographic invasion and the like, … , just when it has found the lion’s approach to its adversary’s weakness, … , just when it has found the virtue of patient methodical attack at its opponents soft spot, … , just when islam has successfully convinced a gulled western socialistic and communistic tradition (and religious tradition, … , oddly enough, i repeat myself about the socialists and communists) that it can live peacefully among its western neighbors and within the context of traditional western diplomacy, … , just at that point it seems determined to speed ahead in a mad and headless pursuit of this bomb.

after years of skillful diplomatic and military feints, after years of sustaining a maximum yield from bluff and bluster, after years of pushing the west and israel just so far, so near the ultimate conflict the west can win and in which islam always finds abject military defeat, and then backing away from the conflict after extracting concessions for not having joined what it has engendered, … , just when success appears in the offing, … , iran appears bound and determined to press the issue, to present the west with a clear choice of defeat via abject surrender to a foe it could pound into dust in mere minutes, or the choice of defending itself, with almost inevitable success lying before it for being goaded into a fight it wins, … , just on the brink of success,  islam will have forced the fight in which it cannot prevail.

iran simply will not give up the manufacture of this bomb.

they cannot have come this far, expended so much, engaged in so many risks, to abandon it now.

they cannot. 

they are simply too close.

it is as though the young lion, having successfully maneuvering himself into position to deliver the crippling bite to the pelvic structure of his fading predecessor, decides that he will attack the arteries of the neck of his adversary, and seemingly prey to a temptation he cannot refuse, forswears the bite to the butt and attacks the toothy end of the old lion.  it is as though the young lion lusts for the dramatic kill and eschews the triumph of patience.

and seals his doom.

iran could simply halt development and production and deployment of its doomsday weapons systems, and reap the diplomatic fruits and victories of its labors, and by doing so take a free nibble from its adversary’s haunches.  all it need do, if it believes victory inevitable as it so professes, is simply wait for the inevitable physical and spiritual and moral weakening of the old lion of the west, simply watch its opponent grow inevitably weaker and more decrepit and bankrupt spiritually and morally, even to the point of allowing and encouraging islam to flourish in its midst.  even as the west declines if will not protect itself, to the extent of allowing islam to attack it internally through its legal and social traditions of free speech and accommodation. even while islam grows stronger in its real assets and weapons, population and religious zealotry and recruitment, fueled by the glut of western oil money, even while in makes serious inroads among the western “intelligentsia,” … , even while this occurs it cannot resist the temptation to attempt conquest in one fell swoop.

Iran/islam can exercise the patience to reap the victory within its grasp.  it lies moribund, without zeal, when it exercises patience.

and, it has proved it cannot resist the attack, because it forges ahead with the development of a weapon whose possession dictates war in the middle east.  it eschews all that it could obtain by the threat of having such a weapon and invites the destruction possession of the weapon dictates.  simply so that it may attack.

it will not stop its manufacture.

it is fundamentally a religious and political institution which needs the passion of conquest, fueled only when it is upon the attack.  please read “the river war,” by sir winston churchill, who fought in the campaign described in the book, to fully comprehend this.

so, i have suggested the utility of a conceptualization of the dynamics of the situation with iran/islam viewing the drive towards a bomb not as an apocalyptic scenario, but rather as a diplomatic ruse by which to force political, social and religious concessions from the west, even as the west, the united states and israel, are driven over time from the middle east.

and, in the end, i reject the utility of so conceptualizing the matter, because it is incompatible with islam’s inherent drive for conquest, the need to fuel its peculiar psychological lust for bloodletting and violence, all in the name of peace, oddly enough.

and, in the end, i reject the utility of so conceptualizing the matter, because such a conceptualization is simply not consonant with the facts of recent history, and with the ultimate, overriding, and definitive fact that iran continues to produce the weapon.

no, iran will not stop building the bomb.  iran will go, in the parlance of the tournament poker player, “all in” on this game.  It will stake all on the luck of the draw of the cards, trusting all to the will of allah.  it is a peculiar fatalism in a very real sense, trusting the luck of the cards over the patient play of many hands.

and, iran by building the bomb will force the west into a situation in which can be perceived only the alternatives of defeat and accommodation to the ascendency of islam, or the application of overwhelmingly superior military and diplomatic assets the exercise of which can only result in overwhelming military victory for the west.

paradoxically, iran will force the west to win, will force the west to use its toothy end as only the west knows how.

quite frankly, it makes absolutely no sense to me.

simply by not disturbing the west in its death throes, simply by letting the old, aging and tired of its own existence western lion wander off into the bushes to find a nice, quiet, cool glade to lie its battered and torn old head on the scarred hide of its forearms and paws, and to die a dignified and calm death, … , simply by doing so, islam and iran could have its victory in 40 or 50 years of continued western decay.

but, this course islam & iran are hell bent to ignore, and they will force the issue.

they attack the lion square in the face of its power, its toothy end, and they will force the confrontation just at a time when that power is still formidable and overwhelming.

it seems that they cannot do otherwise.

the greeks had a word for it.

hubris.

it means an act of human will inviting divine destruction.  it fits rather nicely in this context.

the bolton editorial.  In his article, mr. bolton puts the calculus just as this:

fifth, iran continues to increase the offensive capabilities of surrogates like syria and hezbollah, both of which now have missile capabilities that can reach across israel, as well as threaten u.s. troops and other u.s. friends and allies in the region. it may well be syria and hezbollah that retaliate initially after an israeli strike on iran's nuclear facilities, thus making further strikes against iran more problematic, at least in the short run.  [edited.]

iran is pursuing two goals simultaneously, both of which it is comfortably close to achieving. the first -- to possess all the capabilities necessary for a deliverable nuclear weapon -- is now almost certainly impossible to stop diplomatically. thus, iran's second objective becomes critical: to make the risks of a military strike against its program too high, and to make the likelihood of success in fracturing the program too low. time favors iran in achieving these goals. u.s. and european diplomats should consider this while waiting by the telephone for Iran to call. [edited.]

recognized but not overtly stated by mr. bolton in the above passages is a very salient truth in all of this, and that is the fact that iran is a military pipsqueak, far less powerful in any conventional sense than was iraq under saddam hussein.  the united states could destroy iran’s military capacity in minutes, the simple fact being that iran’s military is comprised of decrepit junk that it cannot service on the ground nor keep in the air.  this is why iran would “strike back” via syria and hezbollah against the united states and israel, because iran lacks the ability to project sufficient power militarily to even reach the united states and israel, much less attack them in any meaningful sense.  it relies on its neighbors and surrogates to do the fighting and dying for it, because it cannot even reach the fight.

this is the true measure of iranian “formidability.”  it does not exist, viz a viz the west, except in the anxieties and fear of callow men, e.g., the leaders and diplomats of the west.  this is the “might” that cows us.

it is passing odd that we would fear iran as it now exists, yet we are indifferent to the very real prospect of a terrible iranian power should it come into possession of a delivery capable nuclear weapons system.  this is a paradox i do not pretend to comprehend, either.

the real fulcrum of mr. bolton’s analysis lies in the following observation, and is the reason why the united states ultimately must take out the iranian nuclear development and deployment program:

thus, iran's second objective becomes critical: to make the risks of a military strike against its program too high, and to make the likelihood of success in fracturing the program too low.

the fact of the matter is, iran can prevent neither the united states nor israel from attacking it with near impunity, the latter observation about israel limited by the reality that israel must be able to get there to attack in the first place.  as it stands right now, the risks associated with air attack by the u.s. and israel is extremely low.  iranian air defense presents little formidable barriers to attack: iran’s air force is a joke, and mostly cannot fly in peace time, let alone sustain the burden of flying war time sorties; the air missile defense is mostly fictional, and “advanced” soviet systems have neither been purchased nor deployed. more importantly, and though he does not say it explicitly, in the above statement is the recognition that israel simply lacks the throw weight of a strategic air force to go in and dig out the iranian assets: it has only attack bombers which cannot reach the full extent of the iranian facilities, in my opinion.  i believe that if pressed on the matter, mr. bolton would concur.

mr. bolton, in my opinion, counsels immediate attack upon the iranian facilities in this passage:

third, although we cannot know for sure, every indication is that iran is dispersing its nuclear facilities to unknown locations, "hardening" against air strikes the ones we already know about, and preparing more deeply buried facilities in known locations for future operations. that means that the prospects for success against, say, the enrichment facilities at natanz are being reduced.

what mr. bolton does not explicitly state, is that this limitation applies only to an israeli attack, given israel’s inability to attack and destroy facilities which are sufficiently hardened.  so this passage in its essence is an encouragement and prod to israel to get with the program now, while its limited assets have some ability to delay if not outright destroy the iranian program.  this observation is not in recognition of any strategic limitation applying to united states assets, because we have them in sufficient quantity and nature to go in and root out the iranian facilities and destroy them, or simply bury them if need be.  it is also, I believe, mr. bolton’s recognition of the stranglehold “the bay of pigs” syndrome has in this time frame, and a reminder to the israeli’s that if they are to act alone in this, they had best do it sooner rather than later.

the above remarks should not suggest criticism of his remarks nor divergence from his basic aims and assumptions on my part, and are simply attempts to suggest some of the contexts in which his remarks may be taken.

i think mr. bolton a cogent and persuasive voice, though it seems lost in the wilderness of western indifference at this point.

but, that is the wonder of iranian conduct.

because it would appear that they press forward in their quest for a nuclear military capacity, circumventing in their eyes the necessity to build and maintain conventional forces in order to project power in the region, and to project power into the underbelly of the soviet remnant.

by doing so, they force the west to attack, and to win, in my estimation.

they have simply chosen to gnaw on the wrong end of the old lion, much, i think, to iran’s eternal regret. 

god willing.

john jay @ 08.__.2008

p.s.  the discerning reader will note that i have not posited who in the leadership of the united states will advocate the attack upon iran i view as so necessary, nor when it will be undertaken.

that is because i haven’t the foggiest notion of who might undertake such a thing, or upon what circumstance.

in this i simply despair.

consider this about mr. bolton.—

to the best of my knowledge he is not a physicist.  nor is his background espionage or intelligence, though as a career diplomat he may be regarded as having “rubbed up against” these disciplines a time or two in his career.

we may safely assume that whoever provided mr. bolton with the physicist’s and engineer’s assessments of the iranian nuclear program, it was not his friend and colleague condi rice, nor any of the islamic apologists within the state department.

the simple fact that mr. bolton has at hand this assessment of the iranian nuclear program is reflective of the great schism within the bush administration on how to approach this matter militarily and diplomatically, and i think that we can safely assume that the conduit of this information is not of the condi rice “persuasion.”

we may also safely assume that mr. bolton is not of the condi rice “persuasion,” as he is not a member of the bush administration.

if this information came to mr. bolton from within the dept. of state, we may safely assume mr. bolton’s position reflective of a minority position in the state department, a minority limited in its ability to voice the “bolton” doctrine, a minority forced to get this to someone like mr. bolton to give these facts and circumstances voice.

to put it bluntly, this is not encouraging.