summer patriot, winter soldier: July 2008

update: recently president obama signed an executive order creating a council of governors to advise on certain issues relating to domestic security, including terrorist attacks, "man-made disasters," and the co-ordinated use of u.s. military and state national guard troops in response thereto. obama signs executive order creating council of governors to establish plans for joint use of u.s. military and national guard in times of “terrorist attack” and “man made disasters.” skullduggery afoot? as the phrase "skullduggery afoot" might suggest, this has raised some concerns regarding repressive measures potentially exacted by the federal government in "reaction" to "man-made" disasters, who defines them, and what might invoke the authority to deploy the u.s. military with the borders and/or confines of our several states: in short, might the government use such an event as a "pretext" to assume absolute control via the use of the united states military.

update: please proceed to the bottom of the post.

second update of the day: please read the following post, which although a bit tongue in cheek, points out that previous presidents, including woodrow wilson and abraham lincoln, have not hesitated to use federal troops in suppressing civilian disturbances, and cites statutory authority in the united states code for the same. http://wjopc.com/site/constitutional/memopres.html .

the militia: bulwark of freedom.

major general raymond “fred” rees is adjutant general of the oregon national guard. he is a graduate of the united states military academy, west point, new york, after having grown up and educated in helix, oregon, just down the road from my home in milton freewater, and near adams and athena, and a couple of grain elevators well known to us locals. it is safe to say that he is a small town boy who has made good, to the extent of having his own helicopter to fly around in, getting all the free “$400 haircuts” a guy could ever want from military barbers, and exercising considerable authority in a very complicated chain of command involving the largest military force in the world. (more on that later.) he is a military man through and through, but he is also informal enough that he has been known to walk into national guard armories in his jeans during those periods while he is home attending the family farm near helix, and to tell soldiers springing to attention to knock it off, that it is just “fred”: he has not shed the “aw, shucks” aspects of his rural upbringing. i suspect he would not be reluctant to order those same soldiers into battle. i happen to know all these things because i went to law school with him, where he was always dressed “high & tight,” and because i just got done talking to a uniformed soldier at the local armory about fred who told me that he still is quite informal, and that he turned down a promotion and billeting to washington d.c. as a three star general in the national guard command structure. he chose to stay in command of the soldiers of his home state, i suspect because he simply chose to retain those ties to the land and people of north east oregon, such ties always involving great bonds of loyalty, and always inhibiting personal ambition and the lures of advancement. he is, from all indications, an oregonian, first and foremost. it is an odd concept these days in some places, ties to an upbringing and a land running ahead of career and personal advancement and “perks,” out of vogue, surely, but not dead.

to say that the soldier at the armory is personally motivated by loyalty to a commander he likes and respects is an understatement of very large dimensions. and i have no doubt that the feeling is wide spread up and down the chain of command in the oregon national guard. it would be an interesting thing to see if fred rees’s ties to oregon were as strong as robert e. lee’s to virginia, and whether the soldiers and the officers of the oregon national guard, (read that as the oregon militia, because that is what it is) were tied to fred rees to the same degree as the soldiers of virginia were tied to robert e. lee.

if you know men, you know that it is not an absurd question, nor a small matter.

and, if you know your history and political science, you will know that the issue of a militia troop’s loyalty to its officers was not a small question to the founders of this country as it pertained to maintaining the liberties of a citizenry, nor was it an absurd matter to those considering whether or not militia troops would fight a standing army maintained by the federal government to prevent the central government from imposing tyranny. (if you think the militia an old & outmoded concept, i will remind you that a goodly number of the soldiers who fought in the civil war were members of privately raised, funded, uniformed, trained and commanded militia groups, taken up into the general chain of command. depending on state constitutions and court decisions, i am not totally convinced that it could not be the same again under some circumstances: find a village common, some rifle and some kewpie hats, and you could be right back in business, as silly as it sounds to say.)(maybe somebody out there might know when the last privately subscribed militia fought under the aegis of the united states, and in what conflict. my guess is teddy roosevelt and the “rough riders” in the spanish-american war. any thoughts on this?)

fred rees is also a lawyer, and practiced briefly in pendleton, oregon before falling sway to his original calling and going back into the military. i do not know if he maintains his membership in the oregon state bar, but would not be surprised to find out that he does.

i am going to switch focus here for a little bit.

liberals decry the american conquest of the north american continent, not the least component of which was the conquest and destruction of the american indian tribes and their ability to wage war upon the settlers and soldiers who overran their land, to the point of their near annihilation. judged from about any perspective it was simply displacing indigenous people and shoving them aside, to make room for the occupation of the continent by the exponents of european civilization: i am not going to place “civilization” in quotes, as some do, as i view that civilization as the greatest and best hope, even yet, for the advancement of mankind. even so, it cannot be gainsaid that the conquest of the land was at the expense of the indians. as for myself, i tend to take the longer more detached view of things, and see it as near inevitability given the relative strengths of the two civilizations as they struggled over possession of the land and who would exercise dominion and control over it, but, then again, i am not an indian.

it seems to me, therefore, something of an irony that most liberals and leftists do not decry with equal fervor the muslim conquest of the west, both in the form of outright jihad and the terror campaign waged on all fronts all over the world, and in terms of the demographic assault by immigration and prolific birthrate by which islam sweeps aside the indigenous populations wherever they go. that this is a conscious conquest by islam is left to no doubt given the pronouncements of imams and ayatollahs the world over, who declare this the precise aim of islam. in simple point of fact, the modus oprendi of islam has been to insinuate itself into a country, mind its own business while it grows it populations, and then at a certain point to agitate for increased influence and privilege, and then at a certain point to overtly and violently seek political and social control of a locale. once such dominance is achieved, then islam’s institutional control is cemented and all opposition is annihilated.

pundits on the left and the right shun the phrase “clash of civilizations” even when they are willing to talk of the underlying realities of the situation, but this is precisely what it amounts to. it is war between the christian/jewish west and the muslim middle east, for dominion and control over the european and american continents, and to the extent that i pay any attention at all as to what is going on in south america and the carribean, it seems to be a conflict in full heat in those regions as well. and, viewed in this matter, with apologies to and no intent to slight the inhabitants of china and the indian subcontinent, the contest between islam and thechristianit/jewish west is a contest for the domination of the world. it is, in reality, a contest between the united states & israel, and the islamic world, for the conquest of the world. europe and russia and japan for reasons of demographics are simply spoils, as they near inevitable collapse: they cannot muster enough interest in existence to replicate.

i see little difference in the campaign by americans to wrest control of north america from its indigenous populations and the campaign by islam to wrest control of europe and north america from the populations who succeeded to “indigenous” status when the land was taken by them. in this, we see the course of history repeated, as the history of mankind has been the history of successive waves of invasion and conquest and consolidation and decline, the latter stage inviting the beginning of the entire process all over again. both campaigns for control were fed by a supreme confidence that the conquest was right and good and proper, and destined, the conquest being viewed by americans under the rubric of “manifest destiny,” and the matter being seen by islam in precisely the same way, as a predetermined religious destiny.

in the present battle for north american and europe, between the islamic middle east and the “christian” west, the west would appear at a distinct disadvantage in terms of the very loose, casual and limp wristed assertion of the worth of its values and beliefs, the “christian” aspect of religious and cultural faith having almost disappeared under hundreds of years of cultural onslaught from leftist doctrine and religious indifference. Islam, by contrast, is at a high water mark in terms of the strength of the belief in its value structure and religion, by its adherents and exponents. oddly enough, the western left, though avowedly believing in nothing and asserting that nothing of the west is to be believed in, or adhered to, has allied itself with islam and generally asserts the superior moral and intellectual position of islam in most adversarial contexts: it is a curious example of the prisoner sharpening the knife for his executioner, because the first persons to go under the knives of muslim conquers will be their leftist enablers.

islam believes very fervently that it has the firm grip on the tiller of destiny, even though the west could send islam’s ambitions into oblivion in mere seconds, were it possessed of sufficient self confidence and belief in its moral authority to exercise such power readily as its disposal to secure its own place in the world. the paradox is that while the west retains the military power to completely destroy islam in seconds, it possesses insufficient belief in its own right of self existence to exercise that power.

right, wrong or indifferently inaccurate on the subject, i believe it is because the west has been almost totally abandoned by its leaders and elites, who have fallen prey to the siren songs of moral relativism as spouted by the left for the last 100 years or so. moreover, i believe the left has made a concerted effort to take over and control the various institutions in our country (a strange assertiveness on the part of people who professedly believe in nothing) and in the west that will allow them to exercise an abject surrender of western interests in the favor of multiculturalism and to the interests of islam. oddly enough, islam has been very skillful at piggybacking its way into following the path and parameters of the same cultural assault, and, to a limited extent, may be seen as insinuating itself into the same institutions to further its conquest, this insinuation being most obvious in the academe, and the federal bureaucracy: not the least surprising, is the success of the same insinuation into the ecumenical religious institutions and bureaucracies, where multiculturalism and a “brotherhood” and “religious tolerance” ridiculously beneficial to islam rules the day.

there is one difference between the present context and the prior and most recent conquest of north america by the forces of european civilization. in my view it is quite material, and relevant to the discussion soon to be at hand. and, that is, i do not intend to give in to the forces of islam, and i surrender nothing to them. and, there is a further difference. not only will i fight to oppose islam, but i will fight those who do not oppose islam, and who counsel what in effect is surrender to islam. and, it should be added, i mean “fight” quite literally.

if i may shift the focus of this again, just a bit.

the views of the left in the halls of academia, in the bureaucratic groves, in the backrooms of government, in the temples of religion and in the exercise of the tremendous influence of the media and the entertainment industry have placed the security of the west and of our liberties in great peril, as they have weakened societal confidence in its own values, and greatly diminished the natural assertiveness of people to defend their values. it is pernicious. one will not defend what he does not believe in, and if a populace believes in nothing, it will not defend itself: this is the great lesson to be taken from the fall of europe. the same views insinuated into our government, turn governmental institutions into hiring halls for nihilists and defeatists, who believe fervently that nothing is worth fighting for. in effect, were our government entirely infected with these views, beset by a tired relativism and cynicism that cannot see the pursuit of policies consistent with western and american values, it would render government into an aider and abettor, enabler, and perhaps an outright accomplice to the islamic conquest of the west and the united states. (i have not forgotten israel. i simply have become tired of appending “… destruction of israel and annihilation of the jews …” to every sentence i write.)

in my view. you may accept or deride it as you wish.

this view may be the view of a partisan sour looser, who does not like to see the reins of power in this country pass from the hands of those to whom he feels emotional and intellectual compatibility, to the likes of barrack obama, nancy pelosi and harry reid, not to mention the soon to be departed teddy kennedy. but, i see in the machinations of those who would curtail our gun rights via international treaty in the face of protections enshrined in the constitutional fabric of our nation and history, and in the machinations of u.n. bureaucrats who hold human rights violations hearings featuring islamic speakers who decry political oppression in this country, very dangerous signs that these worthies and others wish to curtail ancient and important anglo-saxon rights and privileges in order to clear the way for those who would usurp our liberties. wonderful word, “usurp,” kind of out of fashion in this day and age, but used frequently in a more enlightened age: it means to illegitimately or illegally seize power and authority, or to suppress the expression of another’s legal right.

we arrive at my original concerns.

what if our government and supporting institutions are wholly occupied and taken over by persons who are inimically hostile to the heritage of political right and liberty asserted by the citizens on this country, and inimically hostile to our intellectual, political and social heritage for the last 400 years or so of anglo-saxon history, in this country and in england. (“england” is a rhetorical devise used a short hand for the history of our general culture, and no attempt is made to assert that “england” really exists any more except within our historical context, the country itself having vanished in any meaningful sense some time ago, the precise point of its disappearance not being known: all i know with any conviction is that it is gone.)

the precise question posed by this paper, focuses solely on the decisions that major general fred rees and his cohorts in the regular army command of the united states and the various national guard units will make, should this usurpation come to pass.[1]

this question did not go unconsidered at the formation of our county. the concerns behind this question were the concerns of the founders, and openly discussed by them, and they thought that in the structure of the government they proposed and in the history of the nation of men they sought to govern, lay the protections against such usurpers, such would-be tyrants.

central to their conceptions lay the notion of a people jealous of their right and liberty, and overtly hostile to any attempts by those seizing and using the central authority to curtail that right and privilege.

the federalist papers, authored anonymously under the penname “publius” by james madison, alexander hamilton and john jay, are considered organic documents of our system of government, on very nearly equal footing as the constitution itself and the declaration of independence. these various articles, authored as part of the public debate over the ratification of of the constitution, and in support of same, are considered the definitive interpretations on the functions of our government, and are prized for their insights into the political and social implications supporting the structure of the institutions comprising our government.

in articles 28 and 29 of the federalist papers, alexander hamilton, writing as “publius” considered the roles of the various state militias in combating those who would use the very organs of the national government itself to try and usurp and curtail the liberties of the people. now, as a preface, it must be noted that the authors of the federalist papers were not just ordinary commentators, but some of the preeminent politicians, scholars and political thinkers of the day: they were and are among the luminaries of our history, simply put. john jay took part in negotiating the peace of paris which ended the revolutionary war; he authored the constitution of the state of new york, a state in fact and in law the most powerful country on the north american continent until the adoption of the united states constitution, for which the new york constitution served as a textual and structural model, and he would become the first chief justice of the united states. alexander hamilton would become the first secretary of the treasury of the united states, and later an architect of the national banking system and an architect of its system of currency. james madison is considered a “founding father” of the united states, author of its bill of rights to the constitution, and the fourth president of the united states: it is from his meticulous journals that much of our knowledge of the formation of our country was gained. it is “not as though”, in these men, the united states had the authoritative voice of presidents, judges and university professors and political scholars, all contributing to an understanding of our basic laws, it is in actual fact and upon due consideration, precisely the case.

the following words, therefore, are not to be taken lightly, as these words were considered weighty topics by weighty men, offering wise counsel to the consideration of events and eventualities they thought entirely possible and plausible, and which would be central in the fate of the nation they were attempting to create. they viewed and considered, therefore, the precise issues i have raised above, and they viewed the matters discussed below as the last best measures to be taken by citizens, citizen soldiers, patriots and person who believed in the value of their heritage, to protect, preserve and advance that heritage. in short, they thought it entirely plausible that some might used the institution of the government which they were creating to impose tyranny, and they thought the realities discussed below necessary and proper to implement in order to preserve that liberty.

these were not superficial men. they had fought and killed to wrest liberty from those they considered oppressors, and they did not shrink from the prospect of fighting and killing those who might seek to impose oppression upon them in the future. in short, they were jealous of their right and liberty, and they expected their fellow citizens to be of similar disposition and metal, and prone to exercise the same remedies in the face of tyrants that they had.

In no. 28 hamilton considered the possibility that the leaders of the national government might usurp or destroy the liberties of the people, and offered the observations that the various states, their militias and commanding officers in the militia, and an armed citizenry should be able to readily defeat such a cabal. said hamilton, in part:

“if the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but in the exercise of that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and which against the usurpations of the national rulers may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state. in a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct government in each, can take no regular measures for defense. the citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. the usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition in embryo. the smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their early efforts. intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements, and the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part when the opposition has begun. in this situation there must be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.

the obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend them. the natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more competent to struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny. but in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state government, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. the people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. if their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. how wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized!

“it may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the state governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority. projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. the legislatures will have better means of information. they can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community. they can readily communicate with each other in the different states, and unite their common forces for the protection of the common liberty.

“the great extent of the country is a further security. we have already experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. and it would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils. if the federal army should be able to quell the resistance of one state, the distant states would be able to make head with fresh forces. the advantages obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was left to itself, the efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.

“we should recollect that the extent of the military force must, for all events, be regulated by the resources of the country. for a long time to come it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means of doing this increase, the population and natural strength of the community will proportionably increase. when will the time arrive that the federal government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the people of an immense empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of their state governments, to take measures for their own defense, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of independent nations? the apprehension may be considered as a disease, or which there can be found no cure in the resource of argument and reasoning.”

this last observation by publius is within the context of arguing that the opponents to ratification of the constitution were raising a straw man argument by saying that the proposed constitution had no prohibition against standing armies. this publius savages, noting that neither the articles of confederation nor the constitutions of the 13 original states, save in the bill of rights of two of them, and then only subject to the approval of the state legislature, contain such prohibitions: hamilton rather deftly points out that this is really nonsense, in a way, because in all cases the only authority capable of raising a standing army would be the legislature of a state, so what is the point of having the legislature “approve” or “disapprove” its own conduct. finally, hamilton argues that any attempt to impose tyranny by a standing federal army is bound to fail, in the face of the people to exercise their inherent right of self defense, its origins arising in natural law.

as a cautionary note towards adopting hamilton’s argument without question, it should be noted that he never would have anticipated the federal government taking under its own wing the regulation and administration of the state militia’s, e.g., the federal assumption of control over the national guard, nor the advances of military science, nor the incredible lethality and efficiency of modern weapons: his was a day when the cavalry horse was the most potent weapon on a land battlefield, and ships of the line at sea. still in all, as the recent campaigns in iraq and afghanistan point out very well, hamilton was a sagacious judge of the difficulties of suppressing insurrection supported by a people over a large territory.

In no. 29, hamilton looked specifically to the issue as to whether the state militias would have the strength to contest any attempt on the part of a standing army, at the direction of the central authority, to usurp the liberty of the people. he believed that an armed citizenry, which he observed very unique as a political institution in the world, would be more than able to defeat a standing army. said hamilton, in no. 29, first noting the constitutional provision proposed to regulate the militia [this text is within the original constitution, and is not from the 2^nd amendment to the same, which negates the view that the amendment goes to the regulations of militias, they being already “regulated” under the below passage]:

“… to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the united states, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by congress.”

hamilton noted that some opponents to the ratification of the constitution had raised the specter that the above provision might lend itself to the assertion of tyranny via the federal government’s control of the militia, to which assertion he replies:

“’but thought the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of that utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. the attention of the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of moderate size, upon such principles as will really fit it for service in case of need. by thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained militia ready to take the field whenever the defense of the state shall require it. this will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little if at all inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens. this appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist.’”

“thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed constitution should i reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety from the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. but how the national legislature may reason on the point is a thing which neither they nor i can forsee.

“there is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of danger to liberty form the militia that one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice to instill prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism. where in the name of common sense are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? what shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests? what reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the union to prescribe regulations for the militia and to command its services when necessary, while the particular states are to have the sole and exclusive appointment of the officers? if it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the states ought at one to extinguish it. there can be no doubt that this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.”

friends, i cannot tell you what your demographic situations and associations are, but i can tell you who i have associated with and worked with in my life, and i can tell you there is wisdom in hamilton’s observations, to the effect that, where is our common sense if we fear our sons, our brothers, our neighbors with whom we mingle of a daily basis, and with whom we share common sentiments, habits and interests. now, this same observation might be offered of any force comprised of our fellow citizens, but it retains its full force when we consider the community flavor of the national guard or state militia, where people are taken into such service from the communities where they remain, secure in the social and familial matrix from which they have arisen.

in yakima, washington where i toiled in the vineyards of justice for many years, is found a marine reserve detachment of tankers, who have served with distinction many times in the iraqi campaigns, and whose skill and marksmanship with an m-1 abrahams main battle tank is known throughout the united states military. i worked with several of the officers in that unit while they worked as civilian sheriff’s officers for the county, and they would look very dimly indeed upon any government which tried to take away their liberties, or which would try to compromise the position of the nation for which they fought and exposed their lives. i worked with members of the local air force reserve who did multiple tours in afghanistan, as communications and control officers, and were otherwise gentle souls working on behalf of juveniles caught up in the juvenile courts. the daughters of my friends have served as military police officers in iraq, and as truck drivers. i worked in clallam county, washington with ex-fighter pilots who later served in the reserves, and they did not favor the curtailment of the rights for which they fought.

we have little to fear from our fellow citizens with regard to our liberties, for they are as jealous of them as we are, and, dare i say, even more so, because they have fought for them and been exposed to the rigors of battle in asserting them on behalf of other people, less fortunate than ourselves. (yes, it is well to observe that they are less fortunate because they have not themselves asserted those rights and liberties, but, they learn.)

and now, to sort of wrap up these various discussions and synthesize a coherent topic and essay.

so, the question becomes, what would fred rees, as a two star general and adjutant general of the oregon national guard, a graduate of west point and a combat veteran in viet nam, … , what would fred rees do if barrack obama were elected president and it came to pass that he used his new found toy of a security agent to suppress the liberties of the citizenry. if fred rees were asked to use his national guard troops to likewise impose upon the liberties of his fellow citizens, of his fellow oregonians, would he do so? or, would he be inclined to take his troops into the field, and by arms, oppose such a usurpation of our heritage of rights and liberties? what would the u.s. army do?

i will caution you, i have not seen or spoken to fred rees in well over 25 years, and i have not had the benefit of ever speaking to him on any subject even remotely connected with this, and do not know his views. i most certainly do not speak for him, nor with his authority.

i know that as a united states military officer, as an officer and a gentleman, he has sworn to uphold the constitution of the united states. and, that he has tremendous respect for the chain of command, as only what must be nearly 40 years of active service can instill.

i also know that he is a lawyer. and, that he knows full well that the parameters of our rights and privileges have been won by struggle, and the copious spilling of blood by his fellow citizens and by his soldiers, as they have been limned out by violent history and conflict.

i do not believe fred rees would act to suppress his fellow citizens, his beloved oregonians, those people who are precisely his sons and daughters and aunts and uncles, and, … , well, …, so on. i think fred rees would spit in the eye of anyone who asked or commanded such a thing of him. i do not believe that a man who would visit his soldiers in his farmer’s jeans, and tell them to be at ease in the company of “it’s just fred” would betray his friends, his soldiers, men who have entrusted their lives to his patriotism and his judgment.

and, I further believe that his soldiers would follow him in such decisions of conscious. these brave men and women, who have fought in the lonely corners of the world to preserve freedom and to advance liberty, did not come home just so they could turn around and be used to oppress their fellow citizens.

oaths of office, oaths of service, fealty to country and command, … , all of this, could not be used to make such people into oppressors.

if it comes to it, i believe that fred rees and the men and women of the oregon national guard would oppose any national government or command agency which tried to oppress them, and their fellow citizens. and, quite skillfully, and, with deadly accuracy and consequences, for anyone trying to abridge the rights they have sworn to respect and defend. this being the case, for we live in an era in which the members of the national guards and reserves have honed their skills on the battlefield.

in short, as robert e. lee, i believe that they would fight for their home states, and for their families and in an effort to protect their families and their liberties. they would uphold their country, and the constitution for which they have sworn their fealty, and they would not fight to impose either tyranny or a tyrant upon those families and those liberties.

i am tied to my soil. whenever i drive over the ridge at nine mile, and see the opposing ridges and peaks of the blue mountains spread before me, i tear. i tear as I write this, and i am not ashamed to admit it, i love the ground I was born and raised on, and would die to defend it.

i think the person i have known my whole life feel the same way, and i think fred rees and his soldiers do too, and i think that they would follow him to protect this ground, and the liberties and rights of those who have occupied it for generations. quite frankly, i would expect no less of them.

barrack obama may have the loyalties of a bunch of misguided leftist and kids who don’t know any damned better about what he is, and what he wants to do. and, there may be a limited few who would usurp and destroy our liberties with him. he may even try to create an armed agency of persons loyal to his edict, to enforce his edict and impose it upon the citizenry of this country.

but, I don’t think he has enough of them.

and, I don’t think he has enough of them with guns. nor do i think that he will ever command fred rees’s following. fred has got, i believe, too much robert e. lee in him to ever oppress his fellow citizens. g_d forgive barrack obama, and nancy pelosi, and harry reid, should they fail to understand that, because fred rees will not forgive them. he did not fight for his freedoms, for his country, just to turn it over to leftist piss ants so that they could destroy it, trample its liberties, or hand the keys over to islam.

and, don’t forget. fred knows where they keep the keys to the ammunition stores.

in sum, i am not very happy about barrack obama and his ilk assuming the reins of power. and, they may look impressive atop the government’s horse. but, they may find the ride far balkier than they ever thought, because fred rees and his kind can be a pretty stubborn ride, if you catch my drift.

i have never found my faith in “publius,” e.g., jay, hamilton and madison misplaced. read no. 10 of the federalist papers, if you will, for more on this topic. publius understood us far better than barrack obama. publius looked to our habits and dispositions and proclivities in an effort to sustain what he had created, whereas barrack looks simply to fool us, because he has looked at our lesser qualities and is convinced he can, whereas publius looked to our better qualities as a source of hope and optimism. He looked there to find a bulwark against the barracks of the world, which he well anticipated. there has never been a shortage of charlatans and frauds, and we have survived many, and publius has long shown us the way.

John jay, @ 08.09.2008

[1] this day, 07.11.2008 atlasshrugs2000 published an article, “corruption eruption: obama’s garden of corruption and graft, from which the following language is taken:

the man wouldn't get a garden built, are we supposed to hand him the keys to the kingdom and all that treasure? and what, pray tell would he do with it? apparently he wants to create an army of lackeys, ""[w]e are going to grow our foreign service, open consulates that have been shuttered and double the size of the peace corps by 2011 to renew our diplomacy," said obama. "we cannot to continue to rely only on our military in order to achieve the national security objectives that we have set. we have got to have a civilian national security force that is just as powerful, just as strong, just as well funded." (staggering, read it all at iba)

the link to atlasshrugs is http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2008/07/corruption-er-1.html , and i urge you to read the balance of the post.

now, politicians often say things they do not really think about, or really consider the import of what they have said. but, obama just said that he wants to create a federal civilian police security force that is as powerful, as strong, as well funded as the united states military. any similar incidents in history jump to mind: the assimilation of the hitler brown and black shirts into the german military, totally loyal to the nazi party and outside the command structure of the german military. implausible, you say? well, read what obama said. a security agency as “ … strong, powerful and as well funded…” as the united states military. for what use would this agency be put within our borders. we have myriad state and federal police forces already in this country, and they do, by and large, a good job?

to what use, indeed, would this new “agency” be put, not already comprehended within the scheme of existing civilian police forces?

update: update: update:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2010executive_order.pdf -- the executive order on the national guard.

http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/pl110-181.pdf -- the text of public law 110-181, sections 1801 et. seq.

note: (please read slowly and carefully.)

first codification is in public law. text is published in unified form, all in the same spot.

then, the legislation is published in u.s. statutes, a series of books publishing all laws on an annaul basis, and identified as "stat."

finally, codified into the permanent u.s. code, as "__u.s.c. sec. ."

the same law. just different places to find it. and, as you can see, the "public law" sections may end up being codified into many different u.s. code provisions, depending upon the judgment of the codifier where it is appropriate for them to go.

the executive order signed by president obama on its own means not very much. it forms a governor's council as directed by sec.1822 of public law 110-181 (jan. 2008), 122 stat. 3. (bush administration, divided congress.)

beginning at sec. 1801 of the statute, we find "title XVIII" which is the "national guard bureau matters and related matters," and which is codified by reference to 10 united state code 101 (note.), at 122 stat [page] 496.

the sections which follow are mostly technical in nature, and deal with amending sections of 10 united states code sec. 1053, hereinafter, 10 u.s.c. sec. 1053. i set out the entire section following sec. 1801, public law 110-181, 122 stat. 3, and highlight matters which may be of interest to conservatives and others suspicious of obama’s attempts to control the government. what these sections do, in part, is provide for and authorize the use of active duty military personnel in matters of national distress, such as "terrorist acts" or "man-made disasters," ... , which i would assume to comprehend civil disturbance, unrest or rebellion.

this act was passed in president bush's administration, and by a divided congress, republicans in control of one chamber. again, what it does by its terms, is to amend 10 u.s.c. sec. 1053, for the purposes mentioned above. sections of interest are highlighted. [hint: it gets interesting at section 1814.] take a look at sec. 1814(e)(2), which defines natural disaster to include any scenarios as might be envisioned by the department of homeland security, to include right wing anti-abortion zealots and ex-military type, presumably.

there is some room for hanky-panky in the sections that give homeland security the ability to define what “man-made disasters” or civil disturbance might invoke the use of active duty military personnel on u.s. soil, but other sections of the act pretty much mitigate this. for instance, troops deployed in states under such circumstance, e.g., joint military and state national guards, remain in the command of the state governors. [sec. 1814(d)(1), “ … to ensure that governors and local communities are properly informed and remain in control in their respective states and communities.”] (if state governors were in on a scheme with an obama administration, or subsequent marxist administrations, our only recourse would be to take to arms, anyway.) review those sections, highlighted in red.

in the main, the act seems calculated to co-ordinate the use of national guard and u.s. troops in the event of major catastrophe, and envisions that governors command the use of such forces within their borders, retaining full command over national guard troops traditionally used for those functions, in addition to adjunct u.s. military personnel who might be attached. it all seems reasonable enough, in scenarios involving foreign terrorist or foreign governmental nuclear attack upon u.s. soil. the point at which it all might be kind of dubious, very dangerous to our liberties, even, is if the dept. of home land security pursuant to section 1814(4)(2), public law 110-181, 122 stat. [page] 499 were to define & identify political disturbance or dissent as invoking the statute, under this language:

[sec. 1814(e)(2)] ... Any other hazards identified in a national planning scenario developed by the Homeland Security Council.

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;;

TITLE XVIII—NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS

Sec. 1801. Short title.

Subtitle A—National Guard Bureau

SEC. 1801. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ‘‘National Guard Empowerment

Act of 2007’’.

Subtitle A—National Guard Bureau

SEC. 1811. APPOINTMENT, GRADE, DUTIES, AND RETIREMENT OF THE

CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU.

(a) APPOINTMENT.—Subsection (a) of section 10502 of title 10,

United States Code, is amended by striking paragraphs (1) through

(3) and inserting the following new paragraphs:

‘‘(1) are recommended for such appointment by their respective

Governors or, in the case of the District of Columbia,

the commanding general of the District of Columbia National

Guard;

‘‘(2) are recommended for such appointment by the Secretary

of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force;

‘‘(3) have had at least 10 years of federally recognized

commissioned service in an active status in the National Guard;

‘‘(4) are in a grade above the grade of brigadier general;

‘‘(5) are determined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, in accordance with criteria and as a result of a process

established by the Chairman, to have significant joint duty

experience;

‘‘(6) are determined by the Secretary of Defense to have

successfully completed such other assignments and experiences

so as to possess a detailed understanding of the status and

capabilities of National Guard forces and the missions of the

National Guard Bureau as set forth in section 10503 of this

title;

‘‘(7) have a level of operational experience in a position

of significant responsibility, professional military education, and

demonstrated expertise in national defense and homeland

defense matters that are commensurate with the advisory role

of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau; and

‘‘(8) possess such other qualifications as the Secretary of

Defense shall prescribe for purposes of this section.’’.

(b) GRADE.—Subsection (d) of such section is amended by

striking ‘‘lieutenant general’’ and inserting ‘‘general’’.

(b) of such section is amended by striking ‘‘An officer may not

hold that office after becoming 64 years of age.’’.

(d) ADVISORY DUTIES.—Subsection (c) of such section is

amended to read as follows:

‘‘(c) ADVISOR ON NATIONAL GUARD MATTERS.—The Chief of

the National Guard Bureau is—

‘‘(1) a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving

non-federalized National Guard forces and on other matters

as determined by the Secretary of Defense; and

‘‘(2) the principal adviser to the Secretary of the Army

and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and to the Secretary

of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, on

matters relating to the National Guard, the Army National

Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of

the United States.’’.

10 USC 101 note.

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PUBLIC LAW 110–181—JAN. 28, 2008 122 STAT. 497

SEC. 1812. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU AS JOINT

ACTIVITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

(a) JOINT ACTIVITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.—Subsection

(a) of section 10501 of title 10, United States Code, is

amended by striking ‘‘joint bureau of the Department of the Army

and the Department of the Air Force’’ and inserting ‘‘joint activity

of the Department of Defense’’.

(b) JOINT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 1011 of such title is amended

by adding at the end the following new section:

‘‘§ 10508. National Guard Bureau: general provisions

‘‘The manpower requirements of the National Guard Bureau

as a joint activity of the Department of Defense shall be determined

in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of

Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff.’’.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the

beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end

the following new item:

‘‘10508. National Guard Bureau: general provisions.’’.

SEC. 1813. ENHANCEMENT OF FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

BUREAU.

(a) ADDITIONAL GENERAL FUNCTIONS.—Section 10503 of title

10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraph (12) as paragraph (14) and

inserting before such paragraph (14) the following new paragraph

(13):

‘‘(13)(A) Assisting the Secretary of Defense in facilitating

and coordinating with the entities listed in subparagraph (B)

the use of National Guard personnel and resources for operations

conducted under title 32, or in support of State missions.

‘‘(B) The entities listed in this subparagraph for purposes

of subparagraph (A) are the following:

‘‘(i) Other Federal agencies.

‘‘(ii) The Adjutants General of the States.

‘‘(iii) The United States Joint Forces Command.

‘‘(iv) The combatant command the geographic area of

responsibility of which includes the United States.’’;

(2) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (11) as paragraphs

(3) through (12), respectively; and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph

(2):

‘‘(2) The role of the National Guard Bureau in support

of the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air

Force.’’.

(b) CHARTER DEVELOPED AND PRESCRIBED BY SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE.—Section 10503 of such title is further amended—

(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)—

(A) by striking ‘‘The Secretary of the Army and the

Secretary of the Air Force shall jointly develop’’ and

inserting ‘‘The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary

of the Army, and the Secretary of the Air Force, shall

develop’’; and Regulations.

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122 STAT. 498 PUBLIC LAW 110–181—JAN. 28, 2008

(B) by striking ‘‘cover’’ in the second sentence and

inserting ‘‘reflect the full scope of the duties and activities

of the Bureau, including’’; and

(2) in paragraph (14), as redesignated by subsection (a)(1),

by striking ‘‘the Secretaries’’ and inserting ‘‘the Secretary of

Defense’’.

(1) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The heading of section

10503 of such title is amended to read as follows:

‘‘§ 10503. Functions of National Guard Bureau: charter’’.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the

beginning of chapter 1011 of such title is amended by striking

the item relating to section 10503 and inserting the following

new item:

‘‘10503. Functions of National Guard Bureau: charter.’’.

SEC. 1814. REQUIREMENT FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO PREPARE

PLAN FOR RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND TERRORIST

EVENTS.

(a) REQUIREMENT FOR PLAN.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than June 1, 2008, the Secretary

of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland

Security, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander

of the United States Northern Command, and the

Chief of the National Guard Bureau, shall prepare and submit

to Congress a plan for coordinating the use of the National

Guard and members of the Armed Forces on active duty when

responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other

man-made disasters as identified in the national planning scenarios

described in subsection (e).

(2) UPDATE.—Not later than June 1, 2010, the Secretary,

in consultation with the persons consulted under paragraph

(1), shall submit to Congress an update of the plan required

under paragraph (1).

(b) INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO SECRETARY.—To assist

the Secretary of Defense in preparing the plan, the National Guard

Bureau, pursuant to its purpose as channel of communications

as set forth in section 10501(b) of title 10, United States Code,

shall provide to the Secretary information gathered from Governors,

adjutants general of States, and other State civil authorities responsible

for homeland preparation and response to natural and manmade

disasters.

response, one using only members of the National Guard, and

one using both members of the National Guard and members of

the regular components of the Armed Forces.

(d) MATTERS COVERED.—The plan shall cover, at a minimum,

the following:

(1) Protocols for the Department of Defense, the National

Guard Bureau, and the Governors of the several States to

carry out operations in coordination with each other and to

ensure that Governors and local communities are properly

informed and remain in control in their respective States and

communities.

Deadline.

10 USC 113 note.

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PUBLIC LAW 110–181—JAN. 28, 2008 122 STAT. 499

(2) An identification of operational procedures, command

structures, and lines of communication to ensure a coordinated,

efficient response to contingencies.

(3) An identification of the training and equipment needed

for both National Guard personnel and members of the Armed

Forces on active duty to provide military assistance to civil

authorities and for other domestic operations to respond to

hazards identified in the national planning scenarios.

(e) NATIONAL PLANNING SCENARIOS.—The plan shall provide

for response to the following hazards:

(1) Nuclear detonation, biological attack, biological disease

outbreak/pandemic flu, the plague, chemical attack-blister

agent, chemical attack-toxic industrial chemicals, chemical

attack-nerve agent, chemical attack-chlorine tank explosion,

major hurricane, major earthquake, radiological attack-radiological

dispersal device, explosives attack-bombing using improvised

explosive device, biological attack-food contamination,

biological attack-foreign animal disease and cyber attack.

(2) Any other hazards identified in a national planning

scenario developed by the Homeland Security Council.

SEC. 1815. DETERMINATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVIL SUPPORT

REQUIREMENTS.

(a) DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS.—The Secretary of

Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security,

shall determine the military-unique capabilities needed to be provided

by the Department of Defense to support civil authorities

in an incident of national significance or a catastrophic incident.

(b) PLAN FOR FUNDING CAPABILITIES.—

(1) PLAN.—The Secretary of Defense shall develop and

implement a plan, in coordination with the Secretaries of the

military departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, for providing the funds and resources necessary to

develop and maintain the following:

(A) The military-unique capabilities determined under

subsection (a).

(B) Any additional capabilities determined by the Secretary

to be necessary to support the use of the active

components and the reserve components of the Armed

Forces for homeland defense missions, domestic emergency

responses, and providing military support to civil authorities.

(2) TERM OF PLAN.—The plan required under paragraph

(1) shall cover at least five years.

materials accompanying the budget submitted for each fiscal year

a request for funds necessary to carry out the plan required under

subsection (b) during the fiscal year covered by the budget. The

defense budget materials shall delineate and explain the budget

treatment of the plan for each component of each military department,

each combatant command, and each affected Defense Agency.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term ‘‘military-unique capabilities’’ means those

capabilities that, in the view of the Secretary of Defense—

(A) cannot be provided by other Federal, State, or

local civilian agencies; and

10 USC 113 note.

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122 STAT. 500 PUBLIC LAW 110–181—JAN. 28, 2008

(B) are essential to provide support to civil authorities

in an incident of national significance or a catastrophic

incident.

(2) The term ‘‘defense budget materials’’, with respect to

a fiscal year, means the materials submitted to Congress by

the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that

fiscal year.

(e) STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE.—Section 113(g)(2) of title

10, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘contingency plans’’

at the end of the first sentence and inserting the following: ‘‘contingency

plans, including plans for providing support to civil authorities

in an incident of national significance or a catastrophic incident,

for homeland defense, and for military support to civil authorities’’.

Subtitle B—Additional Reserve Component

Enhancement

SEC. 1821. UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND.

(a) MANPOWER REVIEW.—

(1) REVIEW BY CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.—

Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of

this Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit

to the Secretary of Defense a review of the civilian and military

positions, job descriptions, and assignments within the United

States Northern Command with the goal of determining the

feasibility of significantly increasing the number of members

of a reserve component assigned to, and civilians employed

by, the United States Northern Command who have experience

in the planning, training, and employment of forces for homeland

defense missions, domestic emergency response, and providing

military support to civil authorities.

(2) SUBMISSION OF RESULTS OF REVIEW.—Not later than

90 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense

receives the results of the review under paragraph (1), the

Secretary shall submit to Congress a copy of the results of

the review, together with such recommendations as the Secretary

considers appropriate to achieve the objectives of the

review.

(b) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘United States

Northern Command’’ means the combatant command the geographic

area of responsibility of which includes the United States.

SEC. 1822. COUNCIL OF GOVERNORS. [subject of the executive order.]

The President shall establish a bipartisan Council of Governors

to advise the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland

Security, and the White House Homeland Security Council on matters

related to the National Guard and civil support missions.

SEC. 1823. PLAN FOR RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD.

(a) PLAN.—The Secretary of Defense shall develop a plan to

implement revisions that the Secretary determines necessary in

the designation, organization, membership, functions, procedures,

and legislative framework of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. The

plan—

(1) shall be consistent with the findings, conclusions, and

recommendations included in Part III E of the Report of the

President.

Establishment.

32 USC 104 note.

Deadlines.

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PUBLIC LAW 110–181—JAN. 28, 2008 122 STAT. 501

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves of March

1, 2007; and

(2) to the extent possible, shall take into account the views

and recommendations of civilian and military leaders, past

chairmen of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, private organizations

with expertise and interest in Department of Defense

organization, and other individuals or groups in the discretion

of the Secretary.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than July 1, 2008, the Secretary of

Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of

the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the plan

developed under subsection (a), including such recommendations

for legislation as the Secretary considers necessary.

summer patriot, winter soldier

truth for its own sake, regardless of its more unpleasant implications ...

July 2008

July 12, 2008

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